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INTRODUCTION

In the annals of Supreme Court history, George Sutherland
occupies a curious place. Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court
from 1921 to 1938, the Utah native has long been identified as one of
the infamous "Four Horsemen,"1 known largely for his role as a
Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School (Chicago, Illinois).
1.
This pejorative term is short for "The Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse," infamous
mythical figures known for their doleful predictions of gloom. An early, if not the first, formal
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judicial conservative instrumental in the Court's invalidation of
significant aspects of the New Deal. 2 Yet Sutherland was also the
author of several influential opinions involving matters as diverse as
civil rights, 3 freedom of expression, 4 and others that recognized the
broad authority of the federal government in the realm of foreign 5 and
military affairs. 6 A proponent of limited government intervention into
private economic activities, he also advocated the public interest in the
exercise of reasonable controls of private land use. 7 Moreover,
Sutherland did not hesitate to support workers' compensation and
other exercises of governmental authority intended to promote the
public welfare.8 Accordingly, Justice Sutherland might appear to the
modern observer as somewhat of a judicial enigma, who, except for an
occasional progressive lapse, more often than not, imbued his analysis

reference in print to Sutherland and his fellow bloc of dissenters on the Hughes Court-Pierce
Butler, James McReynolds, and Willis Van Devanter-as the "Four Horsemen" appears in FRED
RODELL, NINE MEN: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES FROM 1790 TO 1955, at 217

(1955). While Rodell may have been the first to use the label "Four Horsemen," many derogatory
references to this quartet of Justices appeared in the press during the 1930s. One such variation
was "The Four Horsemen of Reaction." See, e.g., Drew Pearson & Robert S. Allen, Nine Old Men
at the Crossroads, in THE NINE OLD MEN 54, 55 (Drew Pearson & Robert S. Allen eds., 1936)
(using the phrase "Four Horsemen of Reaction"); see also G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION
AND THE NEW DEAL 19 (2000) (discussing usage of the phrase "Four Horsemen").
2.
See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936) (ruling that the Guffey Coal
Act violated the Commerce Clause and also infringed upon contractual liberty in contravention of
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment).
3.
See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932) (finding the appointment of defense
counsel to indigent defendants an essential attribute of due process in a capital case).
4.
See Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 133-41 (1937) (Sutherland, J., dissenting)
(asserting the application of the National Labor Relations Act to the editorial operations of a
news agency restricted the editorial autonomy essential to freedom of the press); Grosjean v.
American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250-51 (1936) (invalidating a Louisiana licensing tax law as a
restriction of freedom of expression). For extensive analysis of Sutherland's First Amendment
jurisprudence, see Samuel R. Olken, The Business of Expression: Economic Liberty, Political
Factions and the Forgotten First Amendment Legacy of Justice George Sutherland, 10 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 249 (2002) [hereinafter Olken, The Business of Expression].
5.
See, e.g., United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 332-33 (1937) (upholding a
presidential executive agreement with the Soviet Union). Analysis of Sutherland's constitutional
jurisprudence of foreign relations, matters of war, and separation of powers is beyond the scope
of this Article.
6.
See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 332-33 (1936)
(sustaining the President's implied statutory authority to prohibit the sale of weapons to foreign
nations at war); United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 625-26 (1931) (upholding
Congressional authority to abridge freedom of speech for national security reasons).
7.
See, e.g., Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926) (upholding a
zoning ordinance as a reasonable exercise of local police powers).
8.
See, e.g., Cudahy Packing Co. v. Parramore, 263 U.S. 418, 426 (1923) (sustaining a Utah
worker's compensation law).
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of constitutional law with principles of laissez-faire economics, 9 Social
Darwinism, 10 and natural law.1 1
Indeed, the principal mistake made by those who have sought
to pigeonhole Sutherland is to assume that his was a constitutional
jurisprudence devoted to preserving the socioeconomic status quo for a
privileged elite 12 and that his judicial motivation reflected an
overriding intent to apply an overarching theory of economic
determinism to the facts of cases. In this regard, some scholars have
erred in reducing the principles of legal classicism, which suffused
constitutional discourse during much of Sutherland's life, to overly
simplistic and exaggerated notions of political economy and the rule of
law and thus have created inaccurate impressions of this now
forgotten, but nevertheless, very important, early twentieth-century
jurist. They have also confused Sutherland's judicial motivation with
the adverse consequences likely to have resulted from some of his
economic liberty opinions and thus have attributed to him an intent to
preserve private property and contract rights at all costs. Indeed,
Sutherland's myopic fealty to an increasingly irrelevant theory of
judicial review may have helped contribute to subsequent
misunderstanding of his counter-majoritarian tendencies and
seemingly naive belief in neutral adjudication.
Analysis of Sutherland's judicial career and his constitutional
values, however, reveals that his was a subtle and nimble mind,
steadfast in its convictions about the virtue of constitutional
limitations of governmental authority as the means for preserving
individual liberties, less doctrinaire than his critics would attest, and
perhaps more nuanced in its application of classical legal principles
than other conservative Justices. Aversion to political factions was the
linchpin of Sutherland's constitutional jurisprudence and the
touchstone from which he limned the contours of public power in a
9.

See, e.g., JOEL FRANCIS PASCHAL, MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND: A MAN AGAINST THE STATE

(1951).
10. See, e.g., J. Francis Paschal, Mr. Justice Sutherland, in MR. JUSTICE 123, 126-28
(Allison Dunham & Philip B. Kurland eds., 1956) (asserting that Social Darwinist Herbert
Spencer influenced significantly Sutherland's constitutional thought).
11.

See

HADLEY

ARKES,

THE

RETURN

OF

GEORGE

SUTHERLAND:

RESTORING

A

JURISPRUDENCE OF NATURAL RIGHTS (1994) (discussing Sutherland's doctrine of natural law).
12. See, e.g., ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 106-07, 109 (2d ed.
1994); ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, THE SUPREME COURT FROM TAFr TO BURGER 51-52, 66-67, 74

(3d rev. ed. 1979); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 228, 233-35 (1993);
BENJAMIN F. WRIGHT, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 198-99, 254-57 (1942);

Ronald F. Howell, The Judicial Conservatives Three Decades Ago: Aristocratic Guardians of the
Prerogatives of Property and the Judiciary,49 VA. L. REV. 1447 (1963); R.A. Maidment, A Study
in Judicial Motivation: Mr. Justice Sutherland and Economic Regulation, 1973 UTAH L. REV.
156, 157, 162.
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democratic republic. Skeptical of public regulation that inured to the
benefit of some groups at the expense of others, Sutherland insisted
upon the equal operation of the law and distinguished between
illegitimate class legislation and valid assertions of governmental
authority that advanced the interests of the public at large. 13 Viewed
from the perspective of Sutherland's factional aversion and his respect
for the principles of legal classicism, Sutherland's seemingly disparate
judicial opinions on the Supreme Court become coherent parts of an
integrated body of work and suggest a more complex set of judicial
concerns than his critics would acknowledge.
This Article first explores the problems of Sutherland's judicial
reputation and suggests that progressive and liberal historians as well
as Supreme Court Justices and constitutional scholars have
misconstrued both the intellectual milieu in which George Sutherland
operated and the contours of his public law jurisprudence. It next
provides a brief overview of the conservative judicial tradition
Sutherland followed and summarizes Sutherland's understanding of
judicial review in a constitutional democracy. The heart of the Article
examines the extent to which Sutherland's jurisprudence of economic
liberty reflected his aversion toward political factions and conviction
that an unelected judiciary should function as the guardian of private
rights threatened by the tyranny of democratic majorities. Thereafter,
the Article links Sutherland's preoccupation with political factions to
his inchoate recognition of the business of expression in the First
Amendment context and his solicitude for criminal procedure. The
Article concludes with a brief assessment of Sutherland's
constitutional legacy in the domestic realm. Analysis of Sutherland's
influence in the areas of foreign policy and separation of powers is
beyond the scope of this Article, which instead focuses upon those
areas of Sutherland's constitutional jurisprudence that scholars have
largely neglected since his departure from the Court seven decades
ago.
I. SUTHERLAND AND THE PROBLEM OF REPUTATION
Several reasons explain George Sutherland's relatively poor
reputation as a Supreme Court Justice. 14 Perhaps the most obvious is
13. See Samuel R. Olken, Justice George Sutherland and Economic Liberty: Constitutional
Conservatism and the Problem of Factions, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 7-8, 58-88 (1997)
[hereinafter Olken, Justice George Sutherland and Economic Liberty] (discussing Justice
Sutherland's attitude towards class legislation and factions).
14. Many constitutional scholars have relegated Sutherland to relative obscurity in the
areas of constitutional law relating to the domestic realm, as opposed to issues involving
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that because Sutherland was the intellectual leader in dissent from
the Supreme Court's transformation of its jurisprudence of economic
liberty during the 1930s, history has relegated him to the role of
villain and has made him a conservative foil to the triumphant liberal
bloc of the Court. Progressive historians of the first decades of the
twentieth century, and the liberal scholars at mid-century who
followed them, often cast Sutherland and the Justices who dissented
from the Court's willingness to adapt the Constitution to changing
economic circumstances-Pierce Butler, James McReynolds, and
Willis Van Devanter-as inflexible jurists unable to shed their
predilections for laissez-faire economics and obsessive devotion to
property rights. 15 Derisively dubbed the "Four Horsemen of the
Apocalypse" by commentators, Sutherland and other conservative
jurists have fared poorly over time in comparison to those JusticesHughes; Stone; and, in particular, Cardozo and Brandeis-admired for
their willingness to balance private rights and the public interest in
16
constitutional adjudication.
separation of powers and foreign policy, where some of his more influential decisions continue to
warrant debate. See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 332-33
(1937) (sustaining broad presidential authority to execute an arms embargo); Humphrey's Ex'r v.
United States, 295 U.S. 602, 631-32 (1935) (limiting presidential authority to remove executive
branch officials); Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488-89 (1923) (invoking the
justiciability doctrine of standing as a prudential limit upon federal judicial power). In part, this
is because the Court has overturned several of his opinions involving economic regulation. See
Paschal, supra note 10, at 123 (commenting on the "obsolescence" of Sutherland's jurisprudence
of economic liberty). The following cases overturned Sutherland opinions concerning economic
regulation: Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236 (1941), overruling Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350
(1928); Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381 (1940), overruling Carter v. Carter
Coal Co. 298 U.S. 238 (1936); Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 US. 405 (1938), overruling Colgate v.
Harvey, 296 U.S. 404 (1935); W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), overruling
Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923). However, thirty years ago, Sutherland received
a ranking of "near great" in ALBERT P. BLAUSTEIN & ROY M. MERSKY, THE FIRST ONE HUNDRED
JUSTICES: STATISTICAL STUDIES ON THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 46 (1978). A more

balanced interpretation of Justice Sutherland appears in David Burner, George Sutherland, in 6
THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, 1789-1978: THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR
OPINIONS 2133, 2133-43 (Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., 1980).
15. See WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE LOST WORLD OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT: LAW AND
IDEOLOGY IN AMERICA, 1886-1937, at 254-62 (1998) (discussing Progressive historiography from
1910 to 1940 and Liberal historiography from 1940 to 1970); WHITE, supra note 1, at 269-301
(comparing the manner in which historians have portrayed various members of the Hughes
Court in light of the 1930s transformation in constitutional interpretation); see also Olken,
Justice George Sutherland and Economic Liberty, supra note 13, at 3-5 & nn. 7-11 (discussing
Sutherland's reputation in the aftermath of the constitutional revolution of the 1930s).
16. See, e.g., ANDREW L. KAUFMAN, CARDOZO 536 (1998) (asserting that Cardozo upheld
governmental decisions and enforced civil liberties on different occasions); ALPHEUS THOMAS
MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN'S LIFE 644 (1956) (discussing Brandeis's commitment to
individual liberty); ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW 683-98
(1951) (describing Stone as a "palladium of freedom"); 2 MERLO PUSEY, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES
717-30 (1951) (describing Hughes as a "guardian of freedom"); PHILIPPA STRUM, LOUIS D.
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Not only does this conventional account portray Sutherland in
an unflattering light, but it casts aside, perhaps for the sake of a
consistent plot, the fact that with respect to most of the early New
Deal programs, Sutherland was hardly alone in his opposition to them
on either separation of powers or Commerce Clause grounds. Indeed, a
near unanimous Court raised numerous constitutional objections to
these poorly drafted legislative reforms. 17 Although the Four
Horsemen often voted together during the 1920s and 1930s, they were
not necessarily the ideological monolith often described in pejorative
terms. Of the four, Pierce Butler was by far the most conservative on
socioeconomic matters and patriotic issues,18 and while James
McReynolds had few peers as a social reactionary, neither Justice, nor
the often ignored Willis Van Devanter, was as motivated by factional
aversion as George Sutherland.
Progressive historians, in particular, including Charles Beard,
the Columbia University economic historian who, at times, consulted
with his former academic colleague Harlan Stone about the economic
BRANDEIS: JUSTICE FOR THE PEOPLE 309-39 (1984) (describing Brandeis's judicial approach to
civil liberties); see also GARY J. JACOBSOHN, PRAGMATISM, STATESMANSHIP, AND THE SUPREME
COURT 181-93 (1977) (describing Chief Justice Hughes's Blaisdell opinion as pragmatic).
17. See, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 548-51 (1935)
(holding that the minimum wage and maximum hour provisions of the National Industrial
Recovery Act violated the delegation doctrine and the Commerce Clause); Panama Refining Co.
v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 433 (1935) (voiding the National Industrial Recovery Act's "hot oil"
provision as an unconstitutional delegation of lawmaking authority); see also BARRY CUSHMAN,
RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 36-39

(1998) (discussing poor draftsmanship).
18. See, e.g., Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 616 (1937) (Butler, J., dissenting)
(asserting that the Social Security Act violated the Tenth Amendment); Morehead v. New York
ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 611 (1936) (asserting a state minimum wage law violated liberty of
contract); Helvering v. Taylor, 293 U.S. 507, 515-16 (1935) (characterizing a federal tax on the
sale of preferred stock as arbitrary and excessive); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932)
(Butler, J., dissenting) (refusing to apply the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to afford indigent criminal defendants the meaningful right to counsel in a rape prosecution);
Near v. Minnesota ex. rel Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 735-36 (1931) (Butler, J., dissenting) (invoking
the need for municipalities to restrict some forms of written expression that amount to a
nuisance); United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 653 (1929) (upholding denial of citizenship
of an elderly Hungarian woman who refrained from swearing to bear arms in defense of the
country in her citizenship application); McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co., 272 U.S. 400, 42021 (1926) (demonstrating Butler's penchant for applying the cost of reproduction theory to help
utility companies in rate evaluation disputes); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S.
365, 397 (1926) (Butler, J., dissenting without opinion from the Court, per Justice Sutherland)
(sustaining a zoning ordinance as a reasonable police powers regulation); Terrace v. Thompson,
263 U.S. 197, 224 (1923) (upholding Washington law restricting aliens from land ownership); see
also DAVID J. DANELSKI, A SUPREME COURT JUSTICE IS APPOINTED (1964) (discussing Piece
Butler's appointment to the Supreme Court); Samuel R. Olken, Butler, Pierce, in 1
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES 209, 209-10 (Paul Finkelman ed., Routledge Press
2006) (biography describing Butler as "one of the most conservative justices ever to sit on the
U.S. Supreme Court").
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and historical context of New Deal constitutional issues, 19 and Edward
S. Corwin, the Princeton political scientist who helped Franklin
Delano Roosevelt formulate the ill-fated Court packing plan, 2 had
strong personal interests in advancing a particular history of the
Court that unfortunately lacked nuance and objectivity. In addition,
journalists who pilloried Sutherland and the other Horsemen of the
21
Apocalypse primarily viewed constitutional issues in political terms
and thus obscured the jurisprudential subtleties and canons of legal
interpretation by which many Lochner-era jurists felt bound.
Sutherland's reluctance
to depart from Lochner's classical
assumptions revealed structural faults in his constitutional thought
and unfortunately made possible a connection between Lochner's
pejorative meaning and Sutherland's own judicial reputation.
In part, progressive and liberal historians' attitudes toward
Sutherland and his fellow constitutional classicists reflected criticism
(both within and beyond the Hughes Court) anticipated years before
by Oliver Wendell Holmes's Lochner dissent, in which the exasperated
philosopher-Justice exclaimed: "This case is decided upon an economic
theory which a large part of the country does not entertain ....The
14th Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social
Statics." 22 Nearly two decades later, William Howard Taft, in an
uncharacteristic tirade against judicial conservatism, reiterated
Holmes's trenchant observation and accused Sutherland of
23
invalidating a minimum wage law on socioeconomic grounds.
Together, these dissents suggested that some early twentieth-century
Justices invoked the abstract doctrine of liberty of contract to mask

19.

See CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE

UNITED STATES 73-151 (Transaction Publishers 1998) (1913) (arguing that the Constitution
reflects the economic interests of the Framers' generation); MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE, supra
note 16, at 410-11 (discussing the relationship between Beard and Stone); Samuel R. Olken,
Charles Evans Hughes and the Blaisdell Decision: A Historical Study of Contract Clause
Jurisprudence,72 OR. L. REV. 513, 584 n.329, 585-86, 589-91 (1993) [hereinafter Olken, Charles
Evans Hughes and the Blaisdell Decision] (discussing Stone's draft concurring opinion in
Blaisdell).
20. WHITE, supra note 1, at 318 n.3. Corwin's explanation of the Supreme Court's role in the
constitutional revolution of the 1930s appears in EDWARD S. CORWIN, CONSTITUTIONAL
REVOLUTION, LTD. 39-79 (1941).
21. Samuel R. Olken, HistoricalRevisionism and ConstitutionalChange: Understandingthe
New Deal Court, 88 VA. L. REV. 265, 279 (2002) [hereinafter Olken, Historical Revisionism and
ConstitutionalChange].
22. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
23. Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 562-67 (1923) (Taft, C.J., dissenting). Taft
commented that "it is not the function of this court to hold congressional acts invalid simply
because they are passed to carry out economic views which the court believes to be unwise or
unsound." Id. at 562.
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their socioeconomic preferences and maintain the illusion of judicial
neutrality, points frequently reiterated in subsequent historical
24
assessments of the Supreme Court.
Both Taft and Holmes could, in other instances, have lodged
these same criticisms against themselves. Taft, for example, normally
a jurisprudential ally of Sutherland-and therefore subject more often
than not to the same charges of socioeconomic determinism as his
close personal friend-was probably, given his general constitutional
views, 25 more disturbed by his colleague's apparent deviation from
post-Lochner precedent than with Sutherland's factional analysis.
Ever cognizant of the legitimacy of judicial review by an unelected
judiciary in a constitutional democracy, Taft may have worried that
Sutherland's opinion might seem reactionary to progressive critics of
the Court still fuming over the Lochner decision. 26 Moreover, Taft's
dissent expressed the very paternalistic attitude towards women that
Sutherland decried both in his majority opinion and years before in
27
the Senate.
24. See, e.g., WIECEK, supra note 15, at 98, 107-08, 132-33, 157 (discussing Lochner era
juridical emphasis upon the neutral operation of the law in order to foster individual liberty); see
also MCCLOSKEY, supra note 12 , at 76-120 (portraying Lochner era jurists as ideologues who
applied laissez-faire economics and Social Darwinism to preserve the economic status quo);
SCHWARTZ, supranote 12, at 225, 228, 233-35 (same); WRIGHT, supra note 12, at 198-99, 254-57
(same).
25. See, e.g., Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus. Relations, 262 U.S. 522, 543-44 (1923)
(Taft, C.J.) (construing narrowly the affectation doctrine to limit the scope of public economic
regulatory authority). See generally ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT: CHIEF
JUSTICE 13-14, 16, 45-48 (1964) (portraying William Howard Taft as a conservative jurist).
26. See MASON, supra note 25, at 249-51 (discussing Taft's dissent in Adkins). In fact, Taft
assumed that the Court had, in Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1918), "overruled [Lochner] sub
silentio," Adkins, 261 U.S. at 562 (Taft, C.J., dissenting), and thus questioned the logic of
Sutherland's rigid adherence to the doctrine of liberty of contract, id. at 562-67.
27. See Adkins, 261 U.S. at 567 (Taft, C.J., dissenting) (suggesting that "[tihe Nineteenth
Amendment did not change the physical strength or limitations of women upon which the
decision in Muller v. Oregon rests"). Conversely, Sutherland thought the recent passage of the
Nineteenth Amendment, pursuant to which women received the right to vote, justified
application of the doctrine of liberty of contract and rendered irrelevant paternalistic precedent
such as Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908). Sutherland commented:
In view of the great-not to say revolutionary-changes which have taken
place since that utterance, in the contractual, political and civil status of
women, culminating in the Nineteenth Amendment, it is not unreasonable to
say that these differences have now come almost ...to the vanishing point. .
. . [We] cannot accept the doctrine that women of mature age, sui juris,
require ...restrictions upon their liberty of contract which could not lawfully
be imposed in the case of men under similar circumstances.
Adkins, 261 U.S. at 553.
Eight years before Adkins, Sutherland, then a member of the United States Senate,
introduced a joint resolution to amend the Constitution to provide women suffrage. 53 CONG.
REC. 75 (1915) (statement of Sen. Sutherland). Sutherland believed that denying women the
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Ironically, Holmes, perhaps the Court's most ardent Social
28
Darwinist given his philosophical record and innate elitism,
implicitly accused conservative Justices of endorsing Social
Darwinism in Lochner with his snide and unsubstantiated remark
about the resonance of Herbert Spencer's Social Statics, a nineteenthcentury tract of political economy that melded the emergent theory of
natural selection with a rigid notion of laissez-faire economics. 29 Scant
evidence, however, supports Holmes's assertion, as neither Spencer,
nor his American disciple, William Graham Sumner, exerted much
30
influence on American jurisprudence during the Lochner era.
Seminal jurists like Sutherland's Michigan law professor Thomas
Cooley considered Social Darwinism too abstract for problems of
constitutional law and expressed doubts about its harsh
31
assumptions.
In the 1930s, as the Court struggled to adopt a course between
legal classicism and modernity in assessing the constitutional limits of
public economic regulation, Sutherland's judicial colleagues Charles

right to vote was "purely artificial.., unjust and [an] intolerant deniala of equality." Id. at
11,318 (1916) (statement of Sen. Sutherland). He questioned such disparate treatment on the
basis of gender, noting that "[i]f it be right to extend the voting privilege to all sorts.., of men, I
am not quite able to see the justice of denying the same right to all sorts ... of women." 51 CONG.
REC. 3601 (1914) (statement of Sen. Sutherland); see also Senator George Sutherland, Speech at
Woman Suffrage Meeting, Belasco Theatre 3-4 (Dec. 12, 1915) (on file with the Vanderbilt Law
Review) (advocating women's suffrage).
28.

See G. EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: LAW AND THE INNER SELF

291, 324, 360 (1993) (discussing Holmes's Social Darwinism). A particularly egregious example of
Holmes's Social Darwinism is his opinion in Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927), wherein he
stated, in support of a Virginia law mandating the sterilization of "mentally defective" persons,
that "[tihree generations of imbeciles are enough."
29. HERBERT SPENCER, SOCIAL STATICS: OR, THE CONDITIONS ESSENTIAL TO HUMAN
HAPPINESS SPECIFIED, AND THE FIRST OF THEM DEVELOPED (1851); see also HERBERT SPENCER,

FIRST PRINCIPLES (1862) (discussing natural selection, human progress, and the virtues of
limited government); HERBERT SPENCER, THE MAN VERSUS THE STATE (1885) (same). Yale
University political philosopher William Graham Sumner was the leading late nineteenthcentury American proponent of Spencer's theories of Social Darwinism and laissez-faire
economics. See 1-2 WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER, ESSAYS OF WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER (Albert
Galloway Keller & Maurice R. Davie eds., 1934) (applying Spencer's theories); WILLIAM GRAHAM
SUMNER, WHAT THE SOCIAL CLASSES OWE TO EACH OTHER (1883) (same).
30. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The PoliticalEconomy of Substantive Due Process, 40 STAN. L.
REV. 379, 403-04, 418-20 (1988) (suggesting the significant influence of classical economic
theory upon Lochner era jurists while discounting their reliance upon Social Darwinism); Olken,
Justice George Sutherland and Economic Liberty, supra note 13, at 30-35 (same).
31. See Alan Jones, Thomas M. Cooley and "Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism" A
Reconsideration, 53 J. AM. HIST. 751, 752, 755-57, 759-64, 766-67, 770-71 (1967) (attributing
Cooley's opposition to class legislation, in part, to his respect for history and the common law
tradition); Olken, Justice George Sutherland and Economic Liberty, supra note 13, at 33-34
(same); Stephen A. Siegel, Historism in Late Nineteenth-Century Constitutional Thought, 1990
WIS. L. REV. 1431, 1493-94, 1497-98, 1501-15, 1540 (same).

HeinOnline -- 62 Vand. L. Rev. 647 2009

648

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:2:639

Evans Hughes and Louis Brandeis poignantly reminded their more
conservative brethren about the need for judicial restraint in
assessing questions of legislative authority, even going so far as to
criticize Sutherland's refusal to recognize the public interest in private
contract rights and his dogged application of traditional police powers
doctrine. 32 In the aftermath of the constitutional revolution of the
1930s, modern jurists eager to distance themselves from Lochner-era
police powers jurisprudence and bolster the Court's institutional
legitimacy 33 also fostered misconceptions about Sutherland and others
who saw themselves as guardians of a constitutional system designed
34
to curb the tyranny of ephemeral democratic majorities.
Invariably, the criticism of classical judges who resisted the
trend to adapt the Constitution to changing economic circumstances
during the initial decades of the twentieth century conflates (and even
35
confuses) laissez-faire economics with laissez-faire constitutionalism.
32. See, e.g., W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391, 398-400 (1937) (asserting the
constitutionality of regulation by legislatures to protect liberties); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v.
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 428, 435, 442-43 (1934) (same). Frustrated by Sutherland's insistence
upon inflexibly applying the Contracts Clause during the Depression, Hughes remarked in
Blaisdell that "[tihe policy of protecting contracts against impairment presupposes the
maintenance of a government by virtue of which contractual relations are worth while, - a
government which retains adequate authority to secure the peace and good order of society." Id.
at 435; see also New State Ice. Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311(1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing the Court's application of substantive due process to thwart the
reasonable exercise of state police powers). Brandeis warned Sutherland and the other Justices
in the majority that in reviewing statutes the Justices "must ever be on our guard, lest we erect
our prejudices into legal principles." Id.
33. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 731-32 (1963) (upholding a Kansas law
monopolizing debt collection). In Ferguson,Justice Black commented the Court should not invoke
"the 'vague contours' of the Due Process Clause to nullify laws which a majority of the Court
believed to be economically unwise . . . . Whether the legislature takes for its textbook Adam
Smith, Herbert Spencer, Lord Keynes, or some other is no concern of ours." Id.; see also
Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 487 (1955) (Douglas, J.) (noting that the Court
would no longer invalidate state economic regulations because they conflict "with a particular
school of thought"); Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952) (Douglas, J.)
(rejecting the notion that the Supreme Court should function as a super-legislature deciding
policy questions concerning public welfare).
34. See WHITE, supra note 1, at 4, 96, 168-69 (discussing guardian judicial review and the
propensity for its practitioners to adhere to rigid classifications and apply seemingly immutable
principles in the resolution of disputes). A prime example of guardian judicial review is Justice
Bradley's statement in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 617, 635 (1886): "[I]llegitimate and
unconstitutional practices get their first footing ... by silent approaches and slight deviations
from legal modes of procedure .... It is the duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional
rights of the citizens, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon."
35. Laissez-faire constitutionalism refers to broad construction of constitutional limits of
governmental authority in order to facilitate personal liberty and does not necessarily require
judicial application of socioeconomic principles to the meaning of constitutional text. Laissezfaire economics is a socioeconomic theory that posits the primacy of unimpeded market forces in
economic affairs and discourages governmental intervention in a presumably self-correcting
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According to Holmes's 1905 observation, later advanced as historical
shibboleth and perpetuated by modern Supreme Court Justices, the
Court's more conservative early twentieth-century jurists used
principles of laissez-faire economics to constrain the scope of public
36
regulation of private businesses.
However, laissez-faire economics was not the principal basis
upon which Lochner-era judges assessed the constitutional limits of
governmental authority. 37 As formulated by Adam Smith in the late
eighteenth century, laissez-faire political economics signified a selfcontained, autonomous economic system in which natural market
forces of supply and demand, free from public regulation, would
furnish prosperity. 38 Strict adherents to laissez-faire economics, of
which there were relatively few in America, believed governmental
intervention for reasons other than the removal of artificial restraints
threatened economic efficiency because it altered the free exchange of
goods and services between individuals in ways that distorted the
value of labor and impaired commercial enterprise.3 9
While Lochner-era jurists were certainly familiar with laissezfaire economics, and even with its expression in terms of Darwinian
natural selection-as articulated by its most rigid proponents, Herbert
Spencer and William Graham Sumner-most judges who applied
substantive due process instead invoked common law precepts of
limited government and equal operation of the law in striking down

market. For an explanation of the differences between laissez-faire constitutionalism and laissezfaire economics, see generally Michael Les Benedict, Laissez-Faire and Liberty: A Re-Evaluation
of the Meaning and Origins of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 3 LAW & HIST. REV. 293 (1985),
which refutes the notion that Lochner era jurists relied upon either laissez-faire economics or
Social Darwinism. Like Benedict, I argue that conservative jurists of the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries were more likely adherents of laissez-faire constitutionalism than
proponents of laissez-faire economics. Olken, Justice George Sutherland and Economic Liberty,
supra note 13, at 5-7, 30, 32-33.
36. See, e.g., MCCLOSKEY, supra note 12, at 81-108 (discussing the Court's drift towards
laissez-faire constitutionalism); Howell, supra note 12 (same); Frank R. Strong, The Economic
Philosophy of Lochner: Emergence, Embrasure and Emasculation, 15 ARIz. L. REV. 419 (1973)
(same). But see Paul Kens, The Source of a Myth: Police Powers of the States and Laissez Faire
Constitutionalism, 1900-1937, 35 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 70 (1991) (arguing that the Court did not
follow laissez-faire capitalism).
37. See HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF
LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE (1993) (arguing that factional aversion
underscored conservative juridical behavior); Olken, Justice George Sutherland and Economic

Liberty, supra note 13, at 9-35 (same); see also Benedict, supra note 35, (emphasizing judicial
concern with preserving individual liberty).

38. Olken, Justice George Sutherland and Economic Liberty, supranote 13, at 30-31.
39. Id.
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economic regulations. 40 Thomas Cooley, for instance, questioned the
utility of using supply and demand to resolve the legality of industrial
regulations. 4 1 Rather than disavow the government's role in economic
development, various segments of American society accepted, to some
extent, public intervention intended to stimulate economic growth in
the form of corporate subsidies, protective tariffs, tax exemptions,
antitrust regulation, bimetallism, and even public education. 42 In fact,
throughout his public career, Sutherland was a staunch advocate of
workers' compensation and other industrial regulations he believed
43
helped the public at large rather than discrete, favored groups.
Partial laws that bestowed benefits on some factions and imposed
burdens on others underscored
inherent tensions in the
transformation from a primarily agricultural and small-scale
entrepreneurial economy to one that featured more large-scale
industrial production. Within this context, late nineteenth- and early
twentieth-century judges confronted the task of construing due
process and the limits upon state police powers.
Less interested in economic theory than in personal economic
liberty, conservative judges like Sutherland invoked the ideal of
government neutrality to protect private economic rights from the
tyranny of shifting democratic majorities whose class legislation
threatened to undermine the equal operation of the laws. Skeptical of
political factions, they regarded constitutional. limitations upon
governmental power as essential to the preservation of individual
liberty. 44 Accordingly, conservative jurists like Sutherland favored
40. GILLMAN, supra note 37; Benedict, supra note 35, at 297-98, 304-05, 311, 314, 331;
Olken, Justice George Sutherlandand Economic Liberty, supra note 13, at 30-31, 33-35.
41. Olken, Justice George Sutherlandand Economic Liberty, supranote 13, at 31.
42. Id. As a United States senator, Sutherland advocated certain protective tariffs if they
represented "a definite and defensible policy of general application" intended to limit "the
artificial inequalities of special privilege." 50 CONG. REC. 4297 (1913) (statement of Sen.
Sutherland) (opposing the Underwood Tariff Bill of 1913 because it favored Southern
agricultural interests at the expense of Western farmers). Unlike steadfast proponents of laissezfaire economics such as William Graham Sumner, Sutherland consistently supported protective
tariffs of general and equal application.
43. See Cudahy Packing Co. v. Parramore, 263 U.S. 418, 426 (1923) (upholding worker's
compensation statute). While in the U.S. Senate, Sutherland chaired a federal commission on
industrial accidents and recommended a statutory compensation scheme that would provide
prescribed awards to all injured workers in place of the inequitable and inconsistent damages
available at common law. See 48 CONG. REC. 4853-54 (1912) (statement of Sen. Sutherland)
(advocating workmen's compensation); 53 CONG. REC. 52 (1916) (statement of Sen. Sutherland)
(introducing a federal workmen's compensation statute).
44. See WIECEK, supra note 15, at 107-08, 112 (discussing classicist judicial view favoring
"equality of right"); Benedict, supra note 35 (discussing the basis for laissez-faire
constitutionalism); Gillman, supra note 37 (discussing the factional aversion of conservative
jurists).
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limited governmental intervention in private economic affairs because
they thought government neutrality was more likely to preserve
45
individual rights through the equal operation of the law.
Moreover, between 1870 and 1937 the Supreme Court actually
upheld most of the industrial regulations before it,46 which belies the
commonly held inaccurate perception that the Justices primarily
interpreted the Constitution through the lens of laissez-faire
economics. Even when Sutherland invalidated public restrictions upon
private economic activities, he decried constitutional adjudication that
substituted the personal views of jurists for seemingly neutral and
detached assessment of the issues. 47 Factional aversion, historical
custom, and respect for precedent formed the constellations of
conservative jurisprudence rather than laissez-faire economics, Social
Darwinism, and natural rights.48 That some of Sutherland's
conclusions may have appeared reactionary should not detract from
his traditional methods nor distort his judicial motivation. As a
classical jurist, Sutherland advocated laissez-faire constitutionalism
without necessarily reading laissez-faire economics into the
Constitution.
Interestingly, even Sutherland's biographers have contributed
to the problem of his judicial reputation. J. Francis Paschal, a student
of Corwin's at Princeton, published the first book-length Sutherland
biography in 1951, at the height of liberal historical scholarship.
Though for the most part a comprehensive study of Sutherland's
public career, the Paschal biography, perhaps unwittingly, portrayed
its subject as "a man against government"-indeed, this is the book's
subtitle-and as a judicial activist whose passion for laissez-faire
economics imbued his constitutional jurisprudence and fueled his

45. WIECEK, supra note 15, at 107-08, 112.
46. See Ray A. Brown, Due Process of Law, Police Power and the Supreme Court, 40 HARV.
L. REV. 943, 944-45 & n.11 (1927) (discussing cases between 1868 and 1927); Melvin I. Urofsky,
Myth and Reality: The Supreme Court and ProgressiveProtective Legislation in the Progressive
Era, 1983 Y.B. SUP. CT. HIST. SOCY 53 (asserting that the Progressive era Court upheld most
reform efforts, contrary to popular belief).
47. Though expressed in dissent, Sutherland cogently explained his opposition to
constitutional adjudication reflective of the policy preferences of judges in West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish,300 U.S. 379, 402 (1937) (Sutherland, J., dissenting), wherein he said: "The suggestion
that the only check upon the exercise of the judicial power . . . to declare a constitutional right
superior to an unconstitutional statute is the judge's own faculty of self-restraint, is both ill
considered and mischievous. Self-restraint belongs in the domain of the will and not of
judgment." Sutherland also cautioned that "[t]he judicial function is that of interpretation; it
does not include the power of amendment under the guise of interpretation." Id. at 404.
48. Olken, Justice George Sutherland and Economic Liberty, supra note 13, at 5-35.
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opposition to the New Deal. 49 Aside from Paschal's failure to consider
Sutherland's factional aversion as well as Sutherland's belief-albeit
incorrect-that invalidating public regulation of private economic
affairs was actually a form of judicial restraint, Paschal does little to
differentiate Sutherland from the more conservative and doctrinaire
members of the Taft and Hughes Courts. Nor does Paschal, or for that
matter most other progressive and liberal historians, account for the
fact that nearly all members of the Hughes Court ruled several
aspects of the early New Deal unconstitutional.
In 1994, the natural rights philosopher Hadley Arkes, in an
attempt to resurrect natural rights in public law discourse, asserted in
his biography of Sutherland that Sutherland suffused his
constitutional jurisprudence with natural rights. 50 Notwithstanding
its creative attempt to portray Sutherland in an alternate light,
Arkes's study is strangely ahistorical and, perhaps inadvertently,
lends credence to the simplistic perception that Sutherland read his
own views into issues before the Court. Sutherland, like other
conservative jurists, on occasion, may have invoked the rhetoric of
natural rights. But, as a faithful adherent of legal classicism,
Sutherland understood the limited utility of natural rights in the
resolution of constitutional disputes and the problems they created for
judges intent upon curbing judicial discretion. 51
49. PASCHAL, supra note 9; see also Paschal, Mr. Justice Sutherland,supra note 10, at 12829 (discussing how Sutherland "adjust[ed] constitutional theory to the demands of his laissez
faire ideology").
50. ARKES, supra note 11. Insofar as Arkes emphasizes natural rights as the basis of
Sutherland's constitutional jurisprudence, he probably overstates its influence as a
constitutional construct. For notwithstanding its rhetorical appeal, most Lochner era jurists
refrained from relying upon principles of natural law in post-Civil war constitutional
adjudication, largely because natural rights theory proved too abstract for determining the
contours of governmental authority. See William E. Nelson, The Impact of the Antislavery
Movement upon Styles of Judicial Reasoning in Nineteenth Century America, 87 HARV. L. REV.
513, 558-60 (1974) (positing that natural law's occupation with unchanging moral principles
made it ill-suited for resolving many legal disputes spawned from industrial change); see also
Stephen A. Siegel, Lochner Era Jurisprudenceand the American Constitutional Tradition, 70
N.C. L. REV. 1, 65-66 (1991) (asserting that Lochner era jurists drew upon historism-a
cultivated sense of history-and common law custom instead of natural rights).
51. Natural rights refer to those rights whose existence does not depend upon positive law.
As with natural rights, the concept of natural law presupposes the existence of unchanging,
eternal moral principles perceived through direct human intuition. In this regard, "[nlatural
rights ... are not something different from natural law but refer to the entitlement aspect of the
relationship created by a natural law." JAMES F. HERGET, AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE, 1870-1970:
A HISTORY 10 (1990). Although "the idea of natural law makes sense as an abstract generality. .
. any attempt to apply it to specific legal and ethical issues is impossible. Hence, the idea is
useless as a practical matter." Id. at 11. Indeed, nearly from the outset of American
constitutional history, some jurists expressed doubts about relying upon natural rights/law
concepts in constitutional adjudication. See, e.g., Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 398-99
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Recent historical analysis of Lochner-era police powers
jurisprudence and legal classicism's effect on constitutional
adjudication during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
affords ample opportunity to reassess the judicial career of George
Sutherland. 52 With its emphasis upon how factional aversion informed
the laissez-faire constitutionalism of conservative jurists between
1870 and 1937, this "revisionist" historical approach affords an
essential perspective from which to examine Sutherland's judicial
motivation and the problems stemming from his devotion to legal
classicism.
II. THE CONSERVATIVE JUDICIAL TRADITION
The conservative judicial tradition to which George Sutherland
adhered arose in the aftermath of the American Revolution. As the
1780s unfolded and social and economic instability ensued from state
inflationary practices, lax credit policies, and ill-conceived debtorrelief legislation, James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John

(1798) (Iredell, J.) (criticizing the wide-ranging assertion of judicial review based upon natural
law principles). But see id. at 387-88 (Chase, J.) (invoking natural law as an independent
limitation of governmental authority). Increasingly, jurists confronted with disputes involving
intangible property and legal problems arising from venture capital throughout the early
nineteenth century realized natural law's limitations as a basis upon which to resolve concrete
legal issues. See WIECEK, supra note 15, at 37 (asserting that insolvency cases forced the Court
to confront tensions and contradictions posed by new forms of property). By the mid-nineteenth
century, natural law theory suffused the inchoate notion of substantive due process as a
restriction of governmental power. See id. at 49-51 (discussing antebellum doctrinal trends); see
also Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378, 415 (1856) (discussing natural rights). In the aftermath
of the Civil War, natural law pretty much disappeared as an independent legal doctrine, its
feasibility largely diminished by the complex legal issues that arose in the post-Civil War
industrial nation. See WIECEK, supra note 15, at 124 (discussing post-war judicial approaches);
see also Nelson, supra note 50, at 558-60 (same); Siegel, Historism, supra note 31, at 1540-44
(observing that Lochner era jurists relied primarily upon historical consciousness, custom, and
common law rather than natural rights/law); Siegel, Lochner Era Jurisprudence,supra note 50,
at 63-66, 76-78, 80 & n.398, 82-90, 96 (describing how late nineteenth-century constitutional
jurisprudence reflected historical custom and common law methods). While some classical jurists
derived from universal principles of
may have retained on some level a "belie[f] that law ...
justice and moral order," WIECEK, supra note 15, at 12, most, like George Sutherland, did not
necessarily regard natural rights/law as the principal basis of their constitutional adjudication,
preferring instead to focus upon constitutional provisions to protect private property from
incursion by class legislation. In essence, factional aversion and a longstanding commitment to
the equal operation of the law comprised critical components of the historical consciousness, or
historism, of Lochner era jurists. See Olken, Justice George Sutherland and Economic Liberty,
supra note 13, at 33-35, 73-81 (discussing Sutherland's historism).
52. See, e.g., GILLMAN, supra note 37 (discussing the influence of factional aversion);
WIECEK, supra note 15 (discussing legal classical thought); Benedict, supra note 35
(differentiating laissez-faire constitutionalism from laissez-faire economics in Lochner era
constitutional interpretation).
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Adams, among others, increasingly expressed grave concerns about
the tyranny of democratic majorities and the problems of political
factions in the new republic. 53 In so doing, they evoked the
commonwealth ideal, expressed over a century earlier by British Whig
political reformers, of a neutral state in which government sought to
promote the general welfare rather than benefit some groups at the
54
expense of others.
Insofar as Madison recognized the inevitable occurrence of
factions in a democratic republic, he expressed hope that
constitutional limitations of governmental authority would curb their
influence in the passage of class, or partial, legislation inimical to the
public good. 55 Hamilton posited that judicial review by an unelected,
independent judiciary would keep political factions in check and
preserve individual rights against the passions and whims of
ephemeral democratic majorities. 56 For the constitutional Framers,
the protection of property rights and contract obligations from
incursion by democratic majorities was of paramount concern. 57
Within this context, the Marshall Court consistently applied the
Contracts Clause as a constitutional limitation upon political factions
that threatened the security of private vested interests. 58
Thereafter, Jacksonian jurists, intent upon reconciling the
permissible scope of government regulation with the preservation of
private property and contract rights, recognized that the legitimacy of
public welfare depended upon the equal operation of the law.
Accordingly, they sustained the exercise of police powers that
promoted public health, safety, morals, or welfare and rejected as

53. See WIECEK, supra note 15, at 23-28 (discussing the political attitudes of the Framers);
Olken, Justice George Sutherlandand Economic Liberty, supra note 13, at 11-13 (same).
54.

See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 53-65

(Univ. of N.C. Press 1998) (1969) (describing eighteenth-century commonwealth ideology);
Benedict, supra note 35, at 316-17 (same).
55.

THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).

56.

THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
57. See JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY (1990) (discussing the

constitutional Framers' perception that, because political factions rendered private property
vulnerable to the whims of democratic majorities, judicial review was an essential means to
protect property rights and other civil liberties from incursion by transient democratic
majorities).
58. See, e.g., Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 653-54 (1819) (ruling
that New Hampshire violated the Contracts Clause when it revoked a private college charter);
Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 142-43 (1810) (invalidating, under the Contracts Clause,
the Georgia legislature's repeal of a prior land grant). For discussion of the Marshall Court's
Contracts Clause jurisprudence, see Olken, Charles Evans Hughes and the Blaisdell Decision,
supra note 19, at 522-32.
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impermissible class legislation attempts by political factions to
manipulate the democratic process through laws that imposed special
burdens on some groups for the benefit of others.5 9 This approach not
only supplanted the theories of natural and vested rights as the main
bases for protecting private economic liberties from democratic
majorities, it also augured the development, decades later, of
substantive due process as a constitutional restriction upon state
police powers.

60

In the late nineteenth century, judges confronted with legal
challenges to the plethora of economic regulations began to construe
broadly the notions of liberty and property within the ambit of
constitutional protection afforded by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. For example, Justice Stephen Field, in his
Munn dissent, recognized the importance of protecting the intangible
use and value of property from incursion by political factions. 61
Eventually, the Court agreed with Field that the concept of due
process included a substantive component that authorized close
judicial scrutiny of both the form of legislation enacted pursuant to
local police powers and its operative effects. 62 Within this context, by
the end of the nineteenth century, state and federal judges borrowed
from the rhetoric of natural law to invoke substantive due process as a

59. See, e.g., Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420, 553 (1837)
(holding a bridge company charter did not create an implied monopoly). Many state courts had
similar cases. See, e.g., Wally's Heirs v. Kennedy, 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 554, 555-57 (1831)
(distinguishing partial laws from those of equal operation while invalidating legislation enacted
to prevent Cherokee Indians from recovering land promised them in federal treaties); Vanzant v.
Waddel, 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 260, 269 (1829) (permitting bank creditors to pursue additional
remedies for collection). Vanzant defined a partial law as one "tending directly or indirectly to
deprive a corporation or an individual rights to property, or to the equal benefits of the general
and public laws of the land." Id.
60. See Olken, Justice George Sutherland and Economic Liberty, supra note 13, at 17-20
(discussing the approach of Jacksonian jurists).
61. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 140-45 (1877) (Field, J., dissenting).
62. See, e.g., Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897) (formally adopting substantive
due process as a constitutional limitation upon state economic regulatory authority); Mugler v.
Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887) (noting that "courts are not bound by mere forms .... They are
at liberty, indeed, are under a solemn duty, to look at the substance of things, whenever they
enter upon the inquiry whether the legislature has transcended the limits of its authority.").
Field expressly linked factional aversion to guardian judicial review when he explained that:
If the courts could not.., examine.., the real character of the act, but must
accept the declaration of the legislature as conclusive, the most valued rights
of the citizen would be subject to the arbitrary control of a temporary
majority of such bodies, instead of being protected by the guaranties of the
Constitution.
Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 696-97 (1888) (Field, J., dissenting).
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fundamental constitutional limitation upon state police powers
63
deemed illegitimate, arbitrary, or unreasonable.
Of particular importance in the emergence of substantive due
process as an independent constitutional restraint upon public control
of private economic activities was Thomas Cooley of the Michigan
Supreme Court, a Jacksonian Democrat and legal scholar whose
influential treatise about constitutional limitations linked judicial
review and factional aversion.6 4 Cooley, who taught George
Sutherland constitutional law at the University of Michigan in 1882,
disavowed laissez-faire economics and Social Darwinism as
jurisprudential guidelines. He instead relied upon longstanding
notions of factional aversion in differentiating permissible and
impermissible police powers regulations. Partial, or class, legislation,
enacted under the guise of local police powers, was unconstitutional,
Cooley argued, because it benefited some groups at the expense of
others in violation of the paramount constitutional principle of equal
operation of the law.6 5 Due process for Cooley, as for Field, implicitly
proscribed class legislation and provided jurists with the
constitutional implement to protect private economic rights from
incursion by democratic majorities controlled by political factions.
Late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century jurists also drew
upon principles of legal classicism in assessing the constitutional
limitations of public power. Classical legal thought both
complemented longstanding notions of factional aversion and provided
a theoretical rationale for judicial conservatism in an era of acute
social and economic turbulence. As a jurisprudential construct about
the role of law in a democratic society, legal classicism formed the

63. See WIECEK, supra note 15, at 125 (discussing the application of substantive due
process by the Court); Olken, Justice George Sutherland and Economic Liberty, supra note 13, at
21-35 (same).
64. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST
UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 3, 35-37, 54-55

(Lawbook Exchange 1999) (1868); see PASCHAL, supra note 9, at 16-20, 36, 127, 170-72
(attributing Sutherland's general skepticism of public regulation to lessons Sutherland absorbed
from Cooley at Michigan Law School); Jones, supra note 31, at 751-52, 755-58, 760, 762-63
(asserting that Cooley's opposition to class legislation rendered him a Jacksonian Democrat).
Though Paschal considered Cooley a proponent of Social Darwinism and laissez-faire economics,
neither Jones nor I share this conclusion.
65. See People v. Salem, 20 Mich. 452, 486-87 (1870) (invalidating a Michigan statute that
conferred unequal benefits upon a railroad to the detriment of the public welfare). In Salem,
Cooley remarked, 'The State can have no favorites ... and [should] . . . give all the benefit of
equal laws." Id.; see also COOLEY, supra note 64, at 355, 389-94 (decrying the vices of class
legislation and linking the legitimacy of governmental authority with the equal operation of the
law).
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intellectual backdrop of post-Civil War constitutional adjudication 66
and exerted a cogent influence upon early twentieth-century jurists
like George Sutherland, who steadfastly adhered to the conservative
judicial tradition.
Legal classicism sanctified the autonomy of the individual and
posited a neutral state in which judges functioned as the guardians of
private rights and liberties from the roiling passions of shifting
democratic majorities. 67 Skeptical of class legislation, classical judges
sought to protect individual free will through means calculated to curb
judicial discretion and foster equal operation of the law. 68 Its
methodology was highly formalistic, and its reasoning inductive as
classical jurists applied abstract concepts based on general legal
principles to discrete categories of disputes with the objective of
deriving seemingly neutral conclusions. 69 Accordingly, classical judges
viewed the Constitution in negative terms as a set of limitations upon
government intended to preserve individual autonomy and considered
problems of public law through the prism of factional aversion.
Through the doctrine of liberty of contract, jurists applied
principles of legal classicism to legislation-both partial (or class) and
impartial-that regulated virtually all aspects of private employment.
Liberty of contract was a concept first articulated by the eighteenthcentury political economist Adam Smith in his influential tract, The
Wealth of Nations. In the United States it was an offshoot of
antebellum free labor ideology 70 and reflected the primacy of
individual will in a democratic society. Accordingly, liberty, or
freedom, of contract presupposed an inherent equality in the

66. See WIECEK, supranote 15, at 3 (discussing legal classicism).
67. See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 154 (1877) (Field, J., dissenting) ("No reason can be
assigned to justify legislation interfering with the legitimate profits of that business, that would
not equally justify an intermeddling with the business of every man in the community ... as his
business became generally useful."); WIECEK, supra note 15, at 11, 81-82 (discussing beliefs and
approaches of classical judges and lawyers).
68. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57-59, 61-64 (1905) (limiting legislative power
to protect liberty of contract); Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U.S. 746, 758-59
(1884) (Field, J., concurring) (same); WIECEK, supra note 15, at 95-96 (discussing Thomas
Cooley), 107-08, 112, 157 (discussing legal classicism).
69. See WIECEK, supra note 15, at 4-5, 89-92 (discussing legal science). Under the precepts
of legal classicism, judges merely "found" the law and applied it to cases; they did not "make" it.
Accordingly, legal classicists disavowed the notion of judge as policy maker. See id. at 5, 7, 13,
80-81, 91-92, 198.
70.

See 1 MELVIN UROFSKY & PAUL FINKELMAN, A MARCH OF LIBERTY: A CONSTITUTIONAL

HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, at 376-78 (2d ed. 2002) (discussing free labor ideology); Charles
McCurdy, The Roots of "Liberty of Contract" Reconsidered: Major Premises in the Law of
Employment, 1867-1937, 1984 Y.B. SUP. CT. HIST. Soc'y 20, 24-26 (discussing ideology of
appellate courts between 1886 and 1937 regarding labor legislation).
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bargaining positions of autonomous individuals who voluntarily chose
71
to enter into contracts.
Later, in dissent from Supreme Court decisions that they
believed incorrectly upheld factional incursion of private economic
rights, Justices Field 72 and Bradley 73 invoked freedom of contract as
both a liberty interest and a property right within the protection of
due process. By the end of the nineteenth century, the Court adopted
this perspective and recognized liberty of contact as "the right to
pursue any lawful business or vocation in any manner not inconsistent
with the equal rights of others."74 Classical jurists on all levels,
immersed in a legal culture that exalted individualism and was
skeptical of class legislation, adopted liberty of contract as a staple of
substantive due process and invoked it as a constitutional limitation
to preserve economic autonomy in an age of increased regulation.
Lochner v. New York 75 was a particularly notorious example of
liberty of contract as a constitutional restriction upon state police
powers. In Lochner, the .Court invalidated a New York law prohibiting
bakers from working more than ten hours a day, or sixty hours per
week. 76 Justice Rufus Peckham's majority opinion for a sharply
divided Court exemplified the formal, categorical reasoning of legal
classicism and its aversion toward political factions. Peckham refused
to acknowledge the vast array of scientific and statistical data in
support of this legislation, and instead he perceived only a remote
connection between the regulation of bakers' hours and public
health. 77 In a curious and somewhat inconsistent admixture of judicial
activism and caution, Peckham struck down the law as impermissible
class legislation that arbitrarily infringed upon the contractual liberty
71. See WIECEK, supra note 15, at 83-87 (discussing classical social outlook); Olken, Justice
George Sutherlandand Economic Liberty, supra note 13, at 26 (discussing liberty of contract); see
also The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 110 n.39 (1873) (Field, J., dissenting) (citing Adam
Smith's comment in The Wealth of Nations: "The Property which every man has in his own
labor.., is the most sacred and inviolable.").
72. See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 87-89, 93, 101-02, 105-07 (Field, J.,
dissenting) (asserting that a Louisiana law that created a butchers' monopoly interfered with the
right of independent butchers to "pursue a lawful and necessary calling," id. at 88-89)).
73. See id. at 116-19, 122 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (asserting that a law creating a butchers'
monopoly violated the Fourteenth Amendment). Bradley distinguished the monopoly provision
from a legitimate local regulation of public health, safety, morals or welfare, noting that "[i]t is
one of those arbitrary and unjust laws made in the interests of a few scheming individuals." Id.
at 120.
74. Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U.S. 746, 757 (1884) (Field, J.,
concurring).
75. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
76. Id. at 52-64.
77. Id. at 57-59, 61-64.
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of both bakers and their employers in an unreasonable manner. 78 In
dissent, Justices Harlan and Holmes expressed dismay and
frustration, accusing their brethren of reading their socioeconomic
views into the Constitution 79 and chastising the Court for its apparent
abdication of judicial restraint.8 0
However, notwithstanding its formalism and narrow
conception of state police powers in Lochner, the Court did not
invalidate most industrial regulations of the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, 8 ' although it created a dichotomy between laws
that involved industrial conditions in general (permissible)8 2 and laws
that interfered with liberty of contract (generally impermissible,
except for some paternalistic exceptions).8 3 Nor did the Justices
necessarily rely upon principles of laissez-faire economics, Social
Darwinism, or even natural rights in devising their categorical police
powers jurisprudence. Individual economic liberty was the ideal to
which these jurists clung even as the assumptions that informed their

78. Id. Peckham said: "The act is not... a health law, but is an illegal interference with the
rights of individuals, both employers and employees, to make contracts regarding labor upon
such terms as they may think best." Id. at 61. He then explained that "laws of this character,
while passed under what is claimed to be the police power for the purpose of protecting the public
health or welfare, are, in reality, passed from other motives." Id. at 64. In essence, Peckham
regarded the act as illegitimate class legislation that subjected the contractual freedom of bakery
owners to "the mercy of legislative majorities." Id. at 59.
79. Id. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 68, 72-74 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Harlan explained: "If there be doubt as to the
validity of the statute, that doubt must therefore be resolved in favor of its validity, and the
courts must keep their hands off, leaving the legislature to meet the responsibility for unwise
legislation." Id. at 68.
81. See supra note 46 and accompanying text (citing examples of the Court upholding
industrial regulations).
82. See, e.g., Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426, 437-38 (1917) (upholding maximum hours
legislation for factory workers as a reasonable exercise of state police powers); Lochner, 198 U.S.
at 61 (suggesting New York could regulate the sanitation, plumbing and ventilation of bakeries
pursuant to the legitimate exercise of local police powers); Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 398
(1898) (upholding Utah's maximum hours limitations for miners and smelters); Barbier v.
Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31-32 (1885) (upholding law mandating that laundries close late at
night).
83. See, e.g., Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 26 (1915) (invalidating a statute barring
yellow-dog (anti-union) contracts); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 180 (1908) (invalidating
a federal prohibition of yellow-dog contracts). But see Bosley v. McLaughlin, 236 U.S. 385, 396
(1915) (sustaining a maximum hours limitation for women who worked in hospitals); Miller v.
Wilson, 236 U.S. 373, 384 (1915) (sustaining a federal law prescribing maximum hours for
female hotel workers); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 423 (1908) (upholding a law prohibiting
women from working more than ten hours a day in factories or laundries). Each of these cases
sustaining laws prescribing maximum hours limitations for women may have reflected, to some
extent, the Court's paternalistic attitudes towards women. See 2 MELVIN L. UROFSKY & PAUL
FINKELMAN, A MARCH OF LIBERTY: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 553-55

(2002) (discussing feminist critiques of Muller).
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constitutional interpretation were becoming obsolete. Though most
classical jurists believed constitutional restrictions existed to preserve
individual autonomy in economic and other forms of activity, theirs
was essentially an abstract laissez-faire constitutionalism devoid of
socioeconomic determinism that used historical custom and precedent
84
in its interpretation of constitutional limitations of public power.
Outwardly cognizant of the need to limit judicial discretion, ironically
they failed to understand that their application of liberty of contract
and other abstract, formal legal doctrines actually helped preserve the
economic status quo in cases like Lochner and belied assertions of
judicial restraint. Ultimately, legal classicism as a viable
constitutional construct would collapse under the weight of its
internal inconsistencies and doctrinal limitations,8 5 as evidenced by
the trajectory of George Sutherland's judicial career.

III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PHILOSOPHY OF GEORGE SUTHERLAND
Prior to joining the Supreme Court in 1922, George Sutherland
enjoyed a distinguished public career in law and politics during which
his understanding of individual liberty, constitutional democracy, the
problems of political factions, and the judicial process coalesced. A
brief summary of Sutherland's views provides an essential perspective
from which to assess his constitutional jurisprudence.
A. Individual Liberty as the Cornerstoneof American Democracy
George Sutherland's admiration for individualism emanated
from his hardscrabble upbringing on the Utah frontier to which he
and his parents had immigrated shortly after his 1862 birth in
England. Employed as a youth in a variety of jobs, he undertook to
help support his struggling family. Sutherland understood the value of
hard work and personal initiative, attributes he considered essential
components of a thriving democratic society. "[B]e independent. Do
your own thinking. Act upon your own judgment and responsibility.
Cultivate self[-]reliance,"8 6 Sutherland encouraged graduates in a
commencement speech at Brigham Young University a year before his
death. Once himself a student at Brigham Young Academy, young
Sutherland learned from the school's director, Karl Maeser, about the
84.

See Olken, Justice George Sutherland and Economic Liberty, supra note 13, at 29-35

(detailing the jurists' views).
85. See WIECEK, supra note 15, at 150, 157, 206, 248-50 (documenting classicism's decline).
86. George Sutherland, Commencement Address at Brigham Young University 9 (1941) (on
file with the Vanderbilt Law Review) [hereinafter BYU Commencement Address].
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importance of personal stability and moral responsibility.8 7 Drawing
upon these lessons decades later, the aged jurist also advised his
commencement audience that "nothing so soon and so effectually
destroys the moral fibre as the habit of constantly referring doubts
and difficulties to others. Solve them for yourselves. Look the world in
the face as an individual and not merely as a part of the general
88
mass."
Often critical of public regulation that he thought weakened
individual initiative and self-reliance, Sutherland believed that
excessive governmental intervention in private economic activity
would "encourage ... indolen[ce]"8 9 and foster lethargy in ways
inimical to the public welfare. "We must be careful not to overdo our
legislation and take from the individual the strengthening effect
which comes from the struggle to help himself,"90 Sutherland confided
to labor advocate Samuel Gompers in 1916 amidst the Progressive-era
clamor for pervasive economic and industrial reform measures.
In the U.S. Senate, Sutherland urged both public officials and
voters to "never lose sight of the vital distinction between
helplessness, which is a misfortune, and laziness, which is a vice," 91
and warned that ill-conceived, partial legislation would imperil
democratic society by thwarting personal ambition and autonomy.
Government, Sutherland thought, should "not impede the initiative of
92
independent persons engaged in productive and moral activities."
93
Instead, it should foster "the release of individual creative energy"
and preserve "personal rights through the equal operation of its
laws. ' 94 Accordingly, Sutherland believed "[i]ndividual liberty and the

87. See Olken, Justice George Sutherland and Economic Liberty, supra note 13, at 38-39
(describing Maeser's influence on Sutherland).
88. BYU Commencement Address, supra note 86, at 9.
89. George Sutherland, The Economic Value and Social Justice of a Compulsory and
Exclusive Workmen's Compensation Law, Address Before the Third Annual Convention of the
International Association of Casualty and Surety Underwriters 11 (July 14, 1913) (on file with
the Vanderbilt Law Review), reprinted in S. DOC. No. 131 (1913) [hereinafter Sutherland,
Economic Value and Social Justice].
90. Letter from George Sutherland to Samuel Gompers 3 (Jan. 15, 1916) (on file with the

Vanderbilt Law Review).
91. Sutherland, Economic Value and Social Justice,supra note 89, at 12.
92. Olken, The Business of Expression, supra note 4, at 260.
93.

JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-

CENTURY UNITED STATES 7 (1956) (describing how Jacksonian democracy transformed American
law).
94. Olken, The Business of Expression, supra note 4, at 260.
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common good are not incompatible, but are entirely consistent with
95
one another."
Though a staunch proponent of "sturdy individualism,"96
Sutherland rejected the harsh implications of Social Darwinism, as
did his influential teachers Karl Maeser and Thomas Cooley. Maeser,
who generally admired the British Social Darwinist philosopher
Herbert Spencer and his emphasis upon self-reliance and individual
freedom, nevertheless disagreed with Spencer's rigid application of
natural selection principles to democratic society, and Maeser
criticized what he perceived was Social Darwinism's materialistic
97
assumptions about personal progress.
Sutherland echoed these sentiments in his support for
government programs such as workers' compensation:
There is a growing feeling that the individualistic theory has been pushed with too
much stress upon the dry logic of its doctrines and too little regard for their practical
operation from the humanitarian point of view ... we can not always regulate our
economic and social relations by scientific formulae, because a good many people
perversely insist upon being fed and clothed and comforted by the practical rule of
98
thumb rather than by the exact rules of logic.

Sutherland realized that without a uniform compensation scheme,
injured workers would likely become more dependent upon society if
unable to recover damages from employers at common law. 99
Sutherland regarded workers' compensation as an impartial
regulation beneficial to the public. For similar reasons he helped
secure passage of Utah's law limiting the hours of those engaged in
ultrahazardous occupations 0 0 and recognized, from a pragmatic

95. George Sutherland, Private Rights and Government Control, American Bar Association
Annual Address (Sept. 4, 1917) (on file with the Vanderbilt Law Review), reprinted in 40 A.B.A.
ANN. REP. 197, 213 (1917) [hereinafter Sutherland, PrivateRights and Government Control].
96. Id. at 202. At times, Sutherland recognized the necessity for government to help those
persons unable to fend for themselves. For example, speaking in support of worker's
compensation, Sutherland remarked, "the prime duty of society, and therefore the prime study of
the lawmaker, should be to prevent or minimize the evils which give rise to the necessity for
assisting the helpless." Sutherland, Economic Value and Social Justice, supra note 89, at 12.
97. See Olken, Justice George Sutherland and Economic Liberty, supra note 13, at 38-39
(explaining Maeser's disagreements with certain aspects of Spencer's philosophy).
98. Sutherland, Economic Value and Social Justice, supranote 89, at 11.
99. See id. at 11-12 (justifying the need for a uniform workmen's compensation scheme); see
also 48 CONG. REC. 4853 (1912) (statement of Sen. Sutherland) (noting that without a prescribed
compensation system for the nation's railway workers, "the injured man or the family that is
left ...not compensated ... [may] become a charge upon society"). Sutherland also commented:
"We must take care that these people do not become wrecks, human driftwood in society. That is
one object of this legislation. The law of negligence is hard; it is unjust, it is cruel in its operation.
The law of compensation proceeds upon broad humanitarian principles." Id.
100. See PASCHAL, supra note 9, at 36 (describing Sutherland's support for this legislation).
The U.S. Supreme Court upheld this law in Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 398 (1898).
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perspective, the ability of organized labor to improve industrial
conditions.101
B. FactionalAversion and the Equal Operation of the Law
At Michigan, Sutherland studied constitutional law under the
eminent scholar-jurist Thomas Cooley, a Jacksonian Democrat, who
not only was critical of Social Darwinism but expressed doubts as well
about the application of laissez-faire economics to constitutional
issues. 10 2 Instead, Cooley stressed the equal operation of the law as
the touchstone of constitutional democracy and questioned the
legitimacy of partial laws enacted by political factions to benefit some
10 3
groups and burden others.
Like Cooley, Sutherland attributed the unequal operation of
the law to the pernicious influence of political factions and
differentiated illegitimate class legislation from the reasonable
exercise of local police powers for the benefit of the public as a whole.
Inherently skeptical of democratic majorities and concerned that their
volatile nature impeded their judgment,10 4 Sutherland decried the
manner in which political factions captured the legislative process.
Cautious in nature, Sutherland was wary of legislative panaceas
enacted in response to the imperatives of political expediency10 5 and
101. See Olken, Justice George Sutherland and Economic Liberty, supra note 13, at 39
(describing Sutherland's support for workmen's compensation bills).
102. See Jones, supra note 31, at 752, 755-57, 759-64, 766-67, 770-71 (discussing Cooley's
historism and factional aversion); Olken, Justice George Sutherland and Economic Liberty, supra
note 13, at 33 (discussing Cooley's historism); Siegel, Historism, supra note 31, at 1493-94,
1497-98, 1501-15, 1540 (discussing Cooley's reliance upon historical custom rather than Social
Darwinism and laissez-faire economics).
103. See People v. Salem, 20 Mich. 452 (1870) (invalidating a Michigan statute that
conferred unequal benefits upon a railroad to the detriment of the public welfare); COOLEY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, supra note 64, at 355, 389-94 (emphasizing this equality of rights
and criticizing special privileges granted to certain groups by statutes); Olken, Justice George
Sutherland and Economic Liberty, supra note 13, at 22-24, 33 (outlining Cooley's jurisprudence
and his reliance on historical tradition).
104. See Olken, Justice George Sutherland and Economic Liberty, supra note 13, at 43-49
(discussing Sutherland's concepts of law and democracy and concerns about political factions and
class legislation); see also George Sutherland, The Courts and the Constitution, Address Before
the American Bar Association (Aug. 28, 1912), reprinted in 35 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 373, 381, 383
(1912) [hereinafter Sutherland, The Courts and the Constitution] (expressing concern about
democratic majorities and the wisdom of legislation enacted in response to popular clamor).
105. See George Sutherland, Principle or Expedient?, Address Before the New York State
Bar Association 20 (Jan. 21, 1921) (on file with the Vanderbilt Law Review) [hereinafter
Sutherland, Principle or Expedient?]. In 1917, as president of the American Bar Association,
Sutherland observed: "The trouble with much of our legislation is that the legislator has
mistaken emotion for wisdom, impulse for knowledge, and good intention for sound judgment."
Sutherland, PrivateRights and Government Control, supranote 95, at 199.
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worried that the tyranny of ephemeral democratic majorities
threatened the security of individual rights and liberties. Accordingly,
he believed the legitimacy of government derived from the impartial
restraint of the law. Class legislation enacted at the behest of political
factions who manipulated the roiling emotions of transient democratic
majorities was "the most odious form of legislative abuse" 10 6 and
subverted the equal operation of the law.
Factional aversion permeated Sutherland's public career. In
the Senate, for example, Sutherland objected to a protective tariff that
reduced rates for southern cotton and sugar farmers and imposed a
competitive obstacle for western agricultural interests. 10 7 He also
invoked the destructive influence of political factions in his passionate
defense of fellow Reed Smoot, a devout Mormon accused of
unsubstantiated political misconduct by Utah Protestants bent on
removing him from the Senate.10 8 Moreover, in 1911, Sutherland
opposed the initiative, referendum, and recall provisions of the
proposed Arizona Constitution because he thought they enabled the
spasmodic impulses of turbulent democratic majorities to impair the
long-term interests of the public welfare.10 9
The plethora of Progressive-era reform legislation worried
Sutherland, who in a speech delivered a year before his ascent to the
Supreme Court revealed the depth of his concern about political
factions:
[Flor if the hand of power shall ever be permitted to take from "A" and give to "B"
merely because "A" has much and "B" has little, we shall have taken the first step upon
that unhappy path which leads from a republic where every man may rise in proportion
to his energy and ability, to a commune where energy and sloth, ability and ignorance,
10
occupy in common the same dead level of individual despair. 1

From Sutherland's perspective, class legislation actually weakened
democracy by thwarting individual initiative, self-reliance, and merit.
Conversely, Sutherland supported workers' compensation and
women's suffrage because their inclusive nature removed the

106. George Sutherland, Private Rights and Government Control, supra note 95, at 212.
107. 50 CONG. REC. 4295 (1913) (statement of Sen. Sutherland) (opposing the Underwood
Tariff).
108. 41 CONG. REC. 1486-87 (1907) (statement of Sen. Sutherland) (defending Sen. Smoot in
a speech); Olken, The Business of Expression, supra note 4, at 263 (describing Sutherland's
defense of Sen. Smoot).
109. 47 CONG. REC. 2793, 2797-98, 2800, 2802 (1911) (statement of Sen. Sutherland). In
particular, Sutherland warned that the initiative and referendum would facilitate manipulation
of the legislative process by political factions to the detriment of unpopular minority groups and
undermine "the deliberate interchange, of conflicting opinion(s]" essential to a democratic
republic. Id. at 2798.
110. Sutherland, Principleor Expedient?, supra note 105, at 18-19.
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and fostered individual

liberty. The denial of the franchise to women particularly bothered
Sutherland, who considered gender discrimination illogical and
undemocratic.11 2 "The course of safety for society, as well as liberty for
the individual, is to make and enforce laws which will keep free the
gates of equal opportunity," 1.13 Sutherland noted shortly before he
joined the Court. For the future jurist, equal operation of the law was
the hallmark of a constitutional system.
C. ConstitutionalConservatism and JudicialReview
In a written constitution, Sutherland found the principal
means to curb democratic majorities and diminish the influence of
political factions. "Constitutions are made ... also for the purpose of

preventing hasty, ill-considered, and unjust action on the part of the
majority of the people themselves,"11 4 the future Justice explained in a
speech critical of Arizona's proposed constitution. Through
limitations-both express and implied-upon governmental authority,
the Constitution, Sutherland believed, preserved individual rights and
liberties from the whims and caprice of popular sentiment.
Accordingly, the Constitution functioned as "the shield of the weak
against the powerful and of the few against the many."1 5
Frequently, Sutherland compared the Constitution to an
edifice, its terms largely immutable and their fundamental meaning
intended to endure through the ages and stabilize a turbulent
democratic society.11 6 Once on the Court, Sutherland resisted efforts to
111. 50 CONG. REC. 4297 (1913) (statement of Sen. Sutherland) (criticizing the Underwood
Tariff Bill as class legislation); see also Olken, Justice George Sutherland and Economic Liberty,
supra note 13, at 44, 47 (describing Sutherland's opposition to the bill).
112. See 51 CONG. REC. 3600-01 (1914) (statement of Sen. Sutherland) (supporting women's
suffrage). Sutherland also remarked:
[T]o deprive... [women] of the right to participate in government is to make
an arbitrary division of the citizenship of the country upon the sole ground
that one class is made up of men, and should therefore rule, and the other
class is made up of women, who should, therefore, be ruled.
George Sutherland, Speech at Women's Suffrage Meeting, Belasco Theatre 3-4 (Dec. 12, 1915)
(on file with the Vanderbilt Law Review). Moreover, Sutherland introduced a joint resolution for
a constitutional amendment for women's suffrage. 53 CONG. REC. 75 (1915) (statement of Sen.
Sutherland).
113. Sutherland, Principle or Expedient?, supra note 105, at 19.
114. 47 CONG. REC. 2800 (1911) (statement of Sen. Sutherland).
115. George Sutherland, Undated/Untitled Speech 2 (on file with author).
116. See George Sutherland, What Shall We Do with the Constitution?,UTAH INDEP. 1, 3-4
(1912) (on file with the Vanderbilt Law Review) (warning against the dangers of the ballot box
and popular majorities). Sutherland said: 'The great purpose of the Constitution is to ...
preserve the rights of the citizen by the definite and unchanging law of the land, instead of
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adapt the Constitution to changing economic circumstances and
openly criticized flexible interpretation of its provisions. 1 17 From his
traditional perspective, constitutional adjudication required judges to
"simply... declare and apply the law [of the Constitution]. '1 18
Essentially a late nineteenth-century legal classical jurist on a
premodern Court, Sutherland ostensibly sought to limit judicial
discretion in constitutional interpretation by refraining from
policymaking and interposing his personal views, 119 relying instead
upon his understanding of historical custom and precedent.
Nowhere was this more evident than in his dissents in Home
Building and Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell1 20 and West Coast Hotel Co. v.
1 21 in which the aging jurist both plaintively and bitterly
Parrish,
assailed a majority of the Court for balancing public power and private
122
rights in assessing the constitutional limits of economic regulation.
In Blaisdell, Sutherland invoked the historical origins of the Contracts
Clause to refute the notion that the Constitution permitted states to
enact debtor relief laws that impaired the obligation of contracts
during times of financial distress 123 and admonished his colleagues
leaving him at the mercy of the transitory opinions of a constantly changing majority." Earlier,
Sutherland compared the Constitution to a building foundation when he commented that "[a]
written constitution means nothing unless it means stability and permanency." 47 CONG. REC.
2794 (1911) (statement of Sen. Sutherland) (advocating strict adherence to the Constitution's
provisions).
117. See W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 403-04 (1937) (Sutherland, J.,
dissenting) ("The meaning of the Constitution is fixed when it is adopted, and it is not different
at any subsequent time when a court has occasion to pass upon it."); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v.
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 449, 451-53, 473 (1934) (Sutherland, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
Constitution's provisions have a fixed meaning). In Blaisdell, Sutherland admonished his
brethren that "[a] provision of the Constitution ... does not mean one thing at one time and an
entirely different thing at another time." Id. at 449. Interestingly, prior to joining the Court,
Sutherland expressed qualified approval of flexible constitutional interpretation in light of
"changing social, industrial and economic conditions" provided doing so did "not alter the
meaning of the [C]onstitution." 45 CONG. REC. 2613, 2619 (1910) (statement of Sen. Sutherland)
(asserting the Commerce Clause allowed the federal government to enact legislation for a postal
savings depository). In Blaisdell, he reiterated this point about constitutional provisions,
explaining "their meaning is changeless; it is only their applicationwhich is extensible." 290 U.S.
at 451.
118. George Sutherland, Undated Speech on Utah Judiciary 3, 19 (on file with the
Vanderbilt Law Review).
119. See W. Coast Hotel Co., 300 U.S. at 402, 404 (Sutherland, J., dissenting) (explaining
that "[t]he judicial function is that of interpretation; it does not include the power of amendment
under the guise of interpretation")
120. 290 U.S. at 448-83 (1934) (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
121. 300 U.S. at 400-14 (1937) (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
122. See id. at 401-04 (arguing that amendment, and not novel judicial interpretations, is
the only proper way to alter the Constitution's provisions); Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 448-53, 473,
483 (same).
123. See Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 453-65, 472 (examining the Contracts Clause's history).

HeinOnline -- 62 Vand. L. Rev. 666 2009

2009]

GEORGE SUTHERLAND

667

that "[i]f the provisions of the Constitution be not upheld when they
pinch as well as when they comfort, they may as well be
abandoned."1 24 Similarly, distressed by the Court's departure from the
Adkins precedent, Sutherland opined in the Washington minimum
wage case that "much of the benefit expected from written
Constitutions [sic] would be lost if their provisions were to be bent to
25
circumstances or modified by public opinion."'
Sutherland's refusal to acknowledge the importance of judges
balancing the rights of interest groups emanated both from his
steadfast adherence to legal classicism-its formalism, its mechanistic
perception of the judicial function, and its core values of individual
autonomy and free will-as well as his traditional factional aversion.
Focused as he was upon political factions and the need to protect
individual economic rights from the tyranny of democratic majorities,
Sutherland ultimately was unable to recognize that the underlying
assumptions of legal classicism were no longer relevant. By the 1930s,
fundamental economic changes required the Justices to assess
constitutional limits of public power as questions of evolving policy
shaped by the conflict of competing interest groups in a dynamic
society. 126 Sutherland, the constitutional conservative, refused to do
this, to the detriment of his judicial reputation, notwithstanding the
integrity of his motives. Sutherland was so intent upon adhering to
the principles of legal classicism that it rendered his constitutional
analysis myopic and susceptible to criticism that it was he who was
reading his own socioeconomic views into the Constitution.
IV. ECONOMIC LIBERTY AND FACTIONAL AVERSION
Much criticism of Sutherland stems from his constitutional
jurisprudence of economic liberty, in which he adhered closely to the
tenets of legal classicism and rarely deviated from its formalistic
assumptions about the primacy of individual autonomy in assessing
the limits of public regulation of private economic affairs. In the
aftermath of the constitutional revolution of the 1930s, Sutherland
emerged as a reactionary jurist who melded constitutional analysis
with socioeconomic determinism to preserve elite property interests
from increased public control. Though, in hindsight, several of
124. Id. at 483.
125. W. Coast Hotel Co., 300 U.S. at 404 (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
126. See WIECEK, supra note 15, at 160, 248-50 (offering reasons for classicism's waning
influence); Olken, Historical Revisionism and Constitutional Change, supra note 21, at 317-20
(discussing constitutional adaptivity as a characteristic of jurisprudential change during the
1930s).
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Sutherland's conclusions were incorrect, so have been conventional
assumptions about his judicial behavior. For it was Sutherland's
factional aversion born from an inherent distrust of democratic
majorities, not principles of laissez-faire economics or Social
127
Darwinism, that permeated his jurisprudence of economic liberty.
At times formalistic in his analysis, Sutherland relied extensively
upon historical custom and precedent in calibrating the permissible
scope of governmental authority. 128 These factors provide an essential
context from which to understand Sutherland's constitutional
interpretation and its problems.
A. Liberty of Contract
Sutherland often invoked liberty of contract in prescribing the
constitutional limits of public economic regulation. Like conservative
jurists before him, he tended to apply this abstract doctrine as a
substantive component of due process in order to preserve private
economic rights from the turbulence of democratic majorities. Less
interested in maintaining the economic status quo than in protecting
economic liberty, Sutherland's principal concern was with illegitimate
class legislation enacted under the guise of local police powers. In this
regard, Sutherland once remarked:
There is no such thing as rights of property apart from the rights of man... [t]he thing
protected by the constitution [sic] is not the right of property, but the right of a person to
property, and this right to property is of the same character as the right to life and
12 9
liberty.

Two of Sutherland's more notorious opinions demonstrate the depth of
his factional aversion. They also underscore the tenacity of his views
and the consistency of his judicial approach toward public regulation
of private economic affairs.
1 30 Sutherland, on behalf of a
In Adkins v. Children's Hospital,
divided Court, asserted that a Washington, D.C. minimum wage law
for women infringed upon contractual liberty in violation of due
process because it interfered with the bargaining positions of parties

127. See Olken, Justice George Sutherland and Economic Liberty, supra note 13 (chronicling
Sutherland's distrust of democratic majorities).
128. See id. at 73-79 (explaining Sutherland's reliance on the common law and precedent).
129. Sutherland, The Courts and the Constitution, supra note 104, at 390 (emphasis added).
"[F]or it is not the right of property which is protected, but the right to property. Property, per se,
has no rights; but the individual ... has ... rights, equally sacred from arbitrary interference:
the right ... to his liberty, the right to his property." Sutherland, Principleor Expedient?, supra
note 105, at 18.
130. 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
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to a private contract. 131 In particular, Sutherland observed how the
law impeded the freedom of women to negotiate their own
132
compensation, yet left men free to bargain for their own terms.
Moreover, the minimum wage act forced employers to pay women a
fixed sum regardless of the value of their labor and of actual business
conditions:
The law takes account of the necessities of only one party to the contract. It ignores the
necessities of the employer by compelling him to pay not less than a certain sum, not
only whether the employee is capable of earning it, but irrespective of the ability of his
business to sustain the burden .... 133

Given Sutherland's previous support of women's suffrage and his
general aversion toward factions, he likely regarded a minimum wage
law for women as both unnecessarily paternalistic and illegitimate
class legislation that bore only a remote connection to public
welfare. 134 Sutherland believed the minimum wage statute was "the
'135
product of a naked, arbitrary exercise of power.
Yet despite its arid formalism and unwavering application of
legal classicism, Sutherland's majority opinion manifested his
overarching concern with the equal operation of the law and the
pursuit of economic liberty. The irony of this paternalistic statute was
not lost on the jurist, who realized that the law's operative effect was
to perpetuate gender discrimination. 136 Indeed, Sutherland noted that
Willie Lyons herself, the employee at the center of this case, did not
lose her job as an elevator operator because of the quality of her job
performance. Instead, she lost her job because her hotel employer
chose to dismiss her rather than risk criminal sanctions for paying her
a wage she found satisfactory but which fell below that prescribed by
13 7
the local administrative board.
Sixteen years later, to Sutherland's dismay, the Court in West
Coast Hotel overruled Adkins and upheld a Washington state

131. Id. at 545, 553-54, 556-59, 561-62. Sutherland regarded the law as impermissible class
legislation because it prescribed a minimum wage that "exceeds the fair value of the services
rendered ... [and] amounts to a compulsory exaction from the employer for the support of a
partially indigent person." Id. at 557.
132. Id. at 553-54.
133. Id. at 557.
134. See id. at 553-54, 556 (discussing the relevance of the Nineteenth Amendment and
public welfare); see also George Sutherland, Speech at Women's Suffrage Meeting, Belasco
Theatre 3-4 (Dec. 12, 1915) (on file with the Vanderbilt Law Review). Moreover, Sutherland
introduced a joint resolution for a constitutional amendment for women's suffrage. 53 CONG.
REC. 75 (1915) (statement of Sen. Sutherland).
135. Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 559 (1923).
136. Id. at 553.
137. See id. at 542-43 (discussing the case's facts).
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minimum wage law for women as a reasonable exercise of local police
powers.1 38 In dissent, Sutherland rebuked the Court for its deference
to public regulation and once again invoked liberty of contract as an
implied constitutional restriction of what he considered class
legislation that imposed an arbitrary and unreasonable burden on
personal economic liberty. 139 As in Adkins, Sutherland considered the
minimum wage statute impermissible because it only applied to
140
women and thus conferred a competitive advantage upon men.
Unlike laws that regulated hours and conditions of labor and
left workers free to negotiate their compensation, 14 ' the Washington
statute impaired directly freedom of contract.' 42 Conversely, in Radice
v. New York,' 43 Sutherland found constitutional a statute that limited
the hours women could work in restaurants because it promoted
public health and safety. 144 However, in West Coast Hotel, Sutherland
perceived only a remote connection between a minimum wage and
public welfare. Most significant was the veteran jurist's refusal to
accept the premise that a public interest inhered in private contracts
and the corollary that changed economic circumstances-in this case
the Depression-warranted a more flexible standard of judicial review
that balanced public power and private rights in determining the
45
constitutional scope of governmental authority.
Sutherland's rigid conception of local police powers arose from
his innate skepticism of democratic majorities. In. keeping with the
legal classicism of the conservative judicial tradition, Sutherland
138. W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391, 398-400 (1937).
139. See id. at 403-04, 407-09 (Sutherland, J., dissenting) (emphasizing freedom of
contract).
140. See id. at 407-08, 411-13 (pointing out the statute's unequal treatment of women).
Sutherland commented "Difference of sex affords no reasonable ground for making a restriction
applicable to the wage contracts of all working women from which like contracts of all working
men are left free ....

The ability to make a fair bargain.

does not depend upon sex." Id. at

413.
141. See id. at 407 (explaining that statutes fixing hours of labor had been upheld); Adkins,
261 U.S. at 553-54 (characterizing the statute at issue as a "price-fixing law").
142. See W Coast Hotel Co., 300 U.S. at 406-10 (noting the statute's arbitrariness and
terming the statute a "compulsory exaction from the employer").
143. 264 U.S. 292 (1924).
144. Id. at 294-96.
145. See W Coast Hotel Co., 300 U.S. at 402-03 (Sutherland, J., dissenting) (refusing to
interpret the Constitution differently even in light of changed economic circumstances). In
contrast, Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes explained that freedom of contract was not an
absolute right but rather protected by due process from unreasonable incursion. "The liberty
safeguarded is liberty in a social organization which requires the protection of law against the
evils which menace the health, safety, morals and welfare of the people." Id. at 391. Moreover,
"regulation which is reasonable in relation to its subject and is adopted in the interests of the
community is due process." Id.
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narrowly applied the common law affectation doctrine 146 to limit the
scope of public regulation of seemingly private businesses. For
example, in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann,147 wherein the Court
invalidated Oklahoma's effort to regulate the manufacture,
distribution, and sale of ice, Sutherland explained that the law
attempted to impede ordinary commercial enterprise through the
guise of local police powers. 148 In effect, the state had conferred a
monopoly status upon established ice businesses to the detriment of
newer, competing entities, a result Sutherland attributed to the
influence of political factions that manipulated the legislative process
for self-interest.' 49 Unlike Justice Brandeis, who in dissent extolled
the virtues of states as laboratories of democracy as a rationale for
judicial restraint, 150 Sutherland thought it imperative for an unelected
judiciary to guard economic liberty from political expedience and the
15 1
tyranny of transient democratic majorities.
146. See, e.g., Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235, 240 (1929) (voiding a Tennessee
statute that prescribed gasoline prices); Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350, 357 (1928) (voiding a
New Jersey law regulating the fees of employment agencies), overruled by Olsen v. Nebraska ex.
rel. W. Reference & Bond Ass'n, 313 U.S. 236, 244 (1941); Tyson & Brother v. Banton, 273 U.S.
418, 445 (1927) (invalidating New York's statutory restriction upon the prices for resold tickets);
see also Adkins, 261 U.S. at 554 (explaining that minimum wage regulation for women neither
prevented fraud nor protected people of diminished contractual capacity, either of which at
common law might justify public interference with a private contract). Under English common
law private property could be subject to public regulation if: (1) the owner of the property
specifically dedicated it to public use; or (2) private use of the property arose from a constructive
monopoly, grant or privilege. See Matthew Hale, De PortibusMaris, in 1 HARGRAVE LAW TRACTS
78 (Francis Hargrave ed., 1787) (listing the common law rules). In Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113,
126 (1877), the Court broadly construed the affectation doctrine when it sustained public
regulation of grain elevator rates, declaring "Property does become clothed with a public interest
when used in a manner to make it of public consequence." However, in Charles Wolff Packing Co.
v. Court of Industrial Relations, 262 U.S. 522, 535, 544 (1923), the Taft Court on which
Sutherland sat constrained this concept when it struck down a Kansas statute that mandated
binding arbitration of wage disputes in the food processing industry because this business was
affected with a public interest.
147. 285 U.S. 262 (1932).
148. Id. at 277-78. Sutherland characterized the manufacture, sale and distribution of ice as
"a business as essentially private in its nature as the business of the grocer, the dairyman, the
butcher, the baker, the shoemaker, or the tailor." Id. at 277.
149. See id. at 277-79 (analyzing the practical effect of the statute). "The control here .
does not protect against monopoly, but tends to foster it. The aim is not to encourage
competition, but to prevent it; not to regulate the business, but to preclude persons from
engaging in it." Id. at 279.
150. See id. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (calling such experimentation a "grave
responsibility").
151. See id. at 280 (warning against experimentation). In 1912, Sutherland observed:
[I]f constitutional and orderly government is to endure there is but one course
for the courts to follow, and that is to set their faces steadily and
unswervingly against any palpable violation of that great instrument, no
matter how overwhelming in the particular instance may be the popular

HeinOnline -- 62 Vand. L. Rev. 671 2009

672

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:2:639

Sutherland's reluctance to expand the category of businesses
affected with a public interest 152 reflected his longstanding concern
about the vulnerability of private economic rights to political factions.
For these reasons, Sutherland also regarded with suspicion state laws
that prescribed price fixing of goods 153 and services 154 or otherwise
restricted the autonomy of businesses engaged in ordinary economic
activity.155 In so doing, Sutherland broadly construed liberty of
contract as a constitutional constraint upon legislation he thought
both partial and arbitrary. 56 However, laws that did not impose
economic burdens on some for the benefit of others withstood
Sutherland's careful scrutiny; for example, Oklahoma's attempt to
create a cotton monopoly met his stringent test of constitutionality
57
because it equally affected all parties subject to its requirements.
B. Licensing Taxes
In some respects, Sutherland's application of substantive due
process, with its emphasis upon the equal operation of the law, drew
upon not only traditional theories of limited government but also
foreshadowed a burgeoning jurisprudence of equal protection the
Court would use with increasing frequency after the 1940s. Indeed,
Sutherland actually relied upon the Equal Protection Clause in
finding unconstitutional a series of state license taxes on chain stores
and other commercial franchises at progressive (graduated) rates
ostensibly intended to enhance retail competition and promote
economic opportunity.1 5 8 As in substantive due process cases,
Sutherland, ever skeptical of governmental intervention into private
economic affairs, insisted that there be a close and substantial
sentiment, or how strong the necessity may seem, for if the door be opened to
such violation or evasion on the ground of necessity we shall be unable to
close it against expediency or mere convenience.
Sutherland, The Courts and the Constitution, supra note 104, at 391.
152. See New State Ice Co., 285 U.S. at 277-79 (opining that the manufacture of ice is not a
business affected with a public interest).
153. See, e.g., Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235, 240 (1929) (voiding a Tennessee
law setting retail gas prices).
154. See, e.g., Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350, 357 (1928) (invalidating New Jersey's
regulation of employment agencies), overruled by Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236, 244 (1941).
155. See, e.g., Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105, 114 (1928) (invalidating a law
banning corporate ownership of pharmacies).
156. See, e.g., Tyson & Brother-United Theatre Ticket Offices, Inc. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418,
430 (1927) (invalidating New York's statutory restriction upon the prices for resold tickets).
157. See Frost v. Corp. Comm'n of Okla., 278 U.S. 515, 528 (1929) (upholding the monopoly).
158. See Olken, The Business of Expression, supra note 4, at 293-98 (discussing divisions
within the Supreme Court during the 1920s and 1930s regarding licensing taxes).
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relationship between the exercise of governmental authority and the
public welfare. 159 Imprecise taxation schemes that treated similarly
situated entities-both personal and corporate-differently were
unconstitutional because their disparate effects were detrimental to
the community.160 Consequently, he decried the differential tax
treatment that some states in the 1920s and 1930s accorded
businesses based upon their size or organizational structure. 16 1 For
example, in his dissent from a case in which the Court sustained a
graduated tax on chain stores, Sutherland asserted that negligible
distinctions between types of commercial enterprises or their volume
of sales did not justify an Indiana law that taxed retail chain stores
more than independent merchants. 162 Often Sutherland characterized
progressive taxes that disproportionately burdened large retail stores
as illegitimate class legislation: "[A] mere subterfuge by which
members of one group of taxpayers are unequally burdened for the
' 16 3
benefit of the members of other groups similarly circumstanced."
Conversely, he sanctioned as beneficial to the public progressive taxes
designed to redress tangible differences between competitive
164
businesses.

159. See, e.g., Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404, 422 (1935) (emphasizing that the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits gross inequality in taxes). "The classification.., must be founded upon
pertinent and real differences, as distinguished from. . . artificial ones." Id. at 423; see also
Olken, The Business of Expression, supra note 4, at 296-98 (discussing Sutherland's opposition
to progressive state license taxes).
160. See, e.g., Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Grosjean, 301 U.S. 412, 430-34 (1937)
(Sutherland, J., dissenting) (emphasizing the disparate effects of the tax); State Bd. of Tax
Comm'rs of Ind. v. Jackson, 283 U.S. 527, 543-48 (1931) (Sutherland, J., dissenting) (examining
the tax and finding no basis for the classification therein).
161. See, e.g., Carmichael v. S. Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 527, 531 (1937) (Sutherland,
J., dissenting) (regarding such distinctions as arbitrary and unconstitutional); Grosjean,301 U.S.
at 430-34 (Sutherland, J., dissenting) (same); Jackson, 283 U.S. at 543-48 (Sutherland, J.,
dissenting) (same).
162. See Jackson, 283 U.S. at 546-48 (finding no justification for the differential tax
treatment of chain stores). Sutherland thought it "wholly irrelevant.., that the business of one
is carried on under many roofs, and that of the other under one only." Id. at 548.
163. Id. at 548. In Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404, 423 (1935), Sutherland explained: "The
test to be applied... is-does the statute arbitrarily and without genuine reason impose a burden
upon one group of taxpayers from which it exempts another group, both of them occupying
substantially the same relation toward the subject matter of the legislation?"
164. See, e.g., A. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40, 43 (1934) (upholding as a reasonable
exercise of state police powers Washington's fifteen-cent tax on butter substitutes); Great N. Ry.
Co. v. Minnesota, 278 U.S. 503, 509 (1929) (upholding Minnesota's taxation of the gross
intrastate business revenue of an interstate railway); Raley & Bros. v. Richardson, 264 U.S. 157,
160 (1924) (sustaining Georgia's taxation of the intrastate business revenue of interstate
brokers).
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C. Formalismand JudicialReview
At times, Sutherland's opinions were quite formalistic,
reflecting his devotion to principles of legal classicism and
demonstrating the limitations of his jurisprudence. Aside from his
frequent invocation of liberty of contract, Sutherland's formalism also
manifested itself in his refusal to recognize the public interest in
private contracts and disdain for adapting the Constitution to
changing economic circumstances. In particular, Sutherland's
Blaisdell dissent demonstrates how formal logic, historicism, and
factional aversion informed his constitutional jurisprudence of
economic liberty.
In Blaisdell, a sharply divided Court upheld the Minnesota
Mortgage Moratorium Law as a legitimate means of altering
contractual remedies during the Depression.' 6 5 Chief Justice Charles
Evans Hughes's majority opinion sought to reconcile the constitutional
prohibition against state impairment of contract obligations with the
reserved powers of the state to promote the public welfare during an
economic emergency occasioned by rampant foreclosures. 166 Five
members of the Court recognized, in Hughes's words, "that the
question is no longer merely that of one party to a contract as against
another, but of the use of reasonable means to safeguard the economic
structure upon which the good of all depends." 167 These Justices
interpreted the scope of the Contracts Clause in a flexible manner that
weighed the public interest in extending the equitable period of
redemption against the private rights of the mortgagee. 6 8

165. See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 444-48 (1934) (giving the
holding of the five-Justice majority).
166. Id. at 435, 437, 439-40, 442-44. Hughes explained that "[tihe policy of protecting
contracts against impairment presupposes the maintenance of a government by virtue of which
contractual relations are worth while,-a government which retains adequate authority to secure
the peace and good order of society." Id. at 435. Hughes also emphasized the "principle of
harmonizing the constitutional prohibition [the Contracts Clause] with the necessary residuum
of state power." Id. Elsewhere, he invoked the "growing recognition of public needs and the
relation of individual right to public security." Id. at 443-44.
167. Id. at 442. Joining Hughes's majority opinion were Justices Brandeis, Cardozo, Stone
and Roberts. See Olken, CharlesEvans Hughes and the Blaisdell Decision, supra note 19, at 58485, 590-91 (discussing how Stone and Cardozo influenced Hughes's analysis of the Contracts
Clause).
168. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 435, 442-44 (1934). Hughes noted the "growing appreciation of
public needs and of the necessity... for a rational compromise between individual rights and the
public welfare." Id. at 442. He also suggested that "the interrelation of the activities of our people
and the complexity of our economic interests, have inevitably led to an increased use of the
organization of society in order to protect the very bases of individual opportunity." Id.
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In contrast, Sutherland, on behalf of the quartet of Justices in
dissent, insisted the Minnesota act retroactively altered contract
rights and duties in violation of the Contracts Clause. 16 9 Convinced
that the mortgage moratorium was an "attempt by legislative devices
170
to shift the misfortune of the debtor to the shoulders of the creditor,"'
Sutherland invoked constitutional history in support of his factional
aversion when he characterized the law as tantamount to the plethora
of unfortunate and ill-considered debtor relief class legislation that
prompted the Framers of the Constitution to create the Contracts
Clause. 17' Reluctant to depart from precedent that restricted public
regulation of contract rights and duties, 172 Sutherland asserted the
Contracts Clause protected the primacy of private contract interests
under all circumstances. 173 Instead of balancing private rights and
public authority in construing the limits of the Contracts Clause,
Sutherland literally construed the clause to prohibit all incursions
upon private contractual obligations. 74 So intent was Sutherland
upon applying the Contracts Clause as a shield against political
factions1 75 and upholding the judicial prerogative to void partial laws,
he did not realize that the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium-a
temporary measure that required the mortgagors to pay the
mortgagee rent at market value in order to continue possession 176also may have actually benefited the mortgagee by preventing it from

169. Id. at 480-83 (Sutherland, J., dissenting). Joining Sutherland in dissent were Justices
Butler, McReynolds and Van Devanter. Id. at 483.
170. Id. at 472.
171. See id. at 453-65, 472 (arguing that the Minnesota act was precisely the type of
legislation that the Framers intended to prohibit with the Contracts Clause).
172. See id. at 480-81 (citing several cases that held private contract rights paramount to
the interest in public regulation).
173. See id. at 473 (declaring that an emergency does not change the meaning of
constitutional restrictions).
174. See id. at 449, 453, 472-73, 482-83 (arguing that the Contracts Clause was adopted to
prevent states from delaying enforcement of private contracts). Invoking a historical perspective
of the Contracts Clause, Sutherland commented that "it legitimately cannot be urged that
conditions which produced the rule may now be invoked to destroy it." Id. at 472. He concluded
that "the contract impairment clause forbids state action under any circumstances, if it have the
effect of impairing the obligation of contracts." Id. at 473.
175. Sutherland characterized the mortgage moratorium statute as an "attempt by
legislative devices to shift the misfortune of the debtor to the shoulders of the creditor." Id. at
472.
176. See The Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Act of 1933, ch. 339, pt. 1, § 4, 1933 Minn.
Laws 514, 518-19, 521 (giving the full details of the Minnesota statute in question in Blaisdell);
see also Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 444-45 (summarizing the Minnesota mortgage moratorium
statute).

HeinOnline -- 62 Vand. L. Rev. 675 2009

676

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:2:639

reselling the property at a loss during an economic recession. 177
Ironically, Sutherland's guardian notion of judicial review, in which
unelected judges applied constitutional provisions of fixed meaning as
a shield against the turbulent tides of democracy,1 7 8 blinded him to the
pitfalls of his analysis17 9 and left him vulnerable to criticism that he
misunderstood the nature of the mortgage moratorium1 8 0 and the
devastating socioeconomic effects of the Depression. In part, the
plaintive tone of his Blaisdell dissent 81 revealed the depth of this
traditional jurist's personal anguish at witnessing the Court's pointed
departure from legal classicism. Yet it also underscored the naivet6 of
some of his jurisprudential assumptions about the impartial restraint
of the law and the virtue of limited government regulation of private
economic affairs.
Sutherland was more obsolescent than reactionary in most
economic liberty cases, as he stubbornly clung to a view of society
comprised of individual actors rather than interest groups.18 2 In large
177. See Olken, Charles Evans Hughes and the Blaisdell Decision, supra note 19, at 597-98
(arguing that Sutherland "incorrectly interpreted the terms of the mortgage in a rigid, technical
fashion").
178. See Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 452 (Sutherland, J. dissenting) (giving an example of
Sutherland's attitude towards judicial review).
179. See Olken, Justice George Sutherland and Economic Liberty, supra note 13, at 86
(observing that Sutherland, at times, did not perceive that adherence to tradition and factional
aversion actually reinforced socioeconomic equality, as in Blaisdell).
180. From a historical perspective, Sutherland's comparison of 1780s debtor relief laws with
Depression era mortgage moratoria may have been incorrect in that the former were intended to
redistribute wealth whereas the latter were not. See id. at 86-87 (comparing the colonial and
Depression era laws).
181. Sutherland began his dissent with the doleful observation that the effects of the
Minnesota mortgage moratorium, "though serious ... [are] of trivial significance compared with
the far more serious and dangerous inroads upon the limitations of the Constitution which are
almost certain to ensue as a consequence naturally following any step beyond the boundaries
fixed by that instrument." Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 448 (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
182. See id. at 451-53, 465, 472-83 (analyzing Minnesota's mortgage moratorium as an
impairment of private contact rights irrespective of the statute's context). Conversely, and with
some sarcasm, Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes remarked: "The policy of protecting contracts
against impairment presupposes the maintenance of a government by virtue of which contracts
are worth while, -a government which retains adequate authority to secure the peace and good
order of society." Id. at 435. Hughes then explained that "the question is no longer merely that of
one party to a contract against another, but of the use of reasonable means to safeguard the
economic structure upon which the good of all depends." Id. at 442. Eleven years earlier,
Sutherland proclaimed the virtue of judicial review in protecting liberty of contract from
incursion by democratic majorities: "To sustain the individual freedom of action contemplated by
the constitution, is not to strike down the common good but to exalt it; for surely the good of

society as a whole cannot be better served than by the preservation against arbitrary restraint of
the liberties of its constituent members." Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 561 (1923).
Fourteen years later, a majority of the Hughes Court rejected this individualistic premise of
guardian review when it overruled Adkins. See W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400
(1937) (concluding that "the case of Adkins v. Children's Hospital, . . . should be, and it is,
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part, this was because of his deep set aversion toward political
factions, which from his perspective not only were responsible for
illegitimate class legislation but also subverted the intrinsic values
and virtues of individual liberty. Accordingly, he invoked liberty of
contract in cases like Adkins, New State Ice Co., and West Coast Hotel,
and he rejected the public interest in private contracts in others, in
order to preserve the autonomy of private enterprise from what he
perceived as the tyranny of shifting democratic majorities.18 3 He also
steadfastly refused to abdicate the traditional guardian approach of
judicial review in favor of the less rigid model of constitutional
adaptivity first embraced by Holmes1 8 4 and Brandeis,1 8 5 and later by
Stone, Cardozo, and Hughes.18 6 Unwilling to balance public power and
private rights, or unable to do so because of his historicism,
Sutherland ultimately found himself on the wrong side of history, and
his jurisprudence of economic liberty largely discredited at his death
in 1942, four years after he retired from the Court.
Interestingly, even at its most formalistic, Sutherland's
constitutional thought manifested an internal logic and clarity not
overruled"). Chief Justice Hughes chided Sutherland and the other three Horsemen who
dissented from the Court's decision to uphold a Washington minimum wage statute,
admonishing them that the Constitution protected "liberty in a social organization which
requires the protection of law against the evils which menace the health, safety, morals and
welfare of the people ... regulation which is reasonable in relation to its subject and is adopted
in the interests of the community." Id. at 391.
183. See Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 450-52, 472 (Sutherland, J., dissenting) (demonstrating
Sutherland's belief in the supremacy of private contractual interests).
184. See Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 569-71 (1923) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the "criterion of constitutionality is not whether we believe the law to be for the
public good"); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75-76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (arguing
that "a Constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory").
185. See, e.g., New State Ice. Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 302-04, 311 (1932) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting) (invoking the laboratories of democracy as a means of judicial restraint in
assessing the reasonableness of state police powers).
186. See W. Coast Hotel Co., 300 U.S. at 389-91 (1937) (explaining the necessity for
reconsideration of judicial precedent in light of changing economic conditions); Blaisdell, 290
U.S. at 426, 428, 435, 438-39, 442-44 (holding that cases "must be considered in the light of our
whole experience and not merely in that of what was said a hundred years ago"). Hughes
remarked: "But where constitutional grants and limitations of power are set forth in general
clauses, which afford a broad outline, the process of construction is essential to fill in the details."
Id. at 426. Hughes also noted "a growing appreciation of public needs and of the necessity of
finding ground for a rational compromise between individual rights and public welfare." Id. at
442. Moreover, Hughes rejected Sutherland's constitutional formalism with the observation that
"to say that the great clauses of the Constitution must be confined to the interpretation which
the Framers, with the conditions and outlooks of their time, would have placed upon them, the

statement carries its own refutation." Id. at 443; see also Olken, Charles Evans Hughes and the
Blaisdell Decision, supra note 19, at 590-91 (discussing the influence of Stone and Cardozo on
Hughes); Olken, Historical Revisionism and Constitutional Change, supra note 21, at 311-20
(discussing constitutional adaptivity and judicial deference during the 1930s).
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often acknowledged by his critics. For example, in Carter v. Carter
Coal Co.,' 8 7 Sutherland set forth a seemingly rigid distinction between
manufacturing and commerce in a majority opinion that rejected the
authority of the federal government to regulate the hours and wages
of miners.18 8 Yet despite his reluctance to jettison traditional
assumptions about contractual autonomy during changed economic
circumstances, Sutherland nevertheless managed to explain in most
lucid terms the late nineteenth-century conception of commerce in a
manner devoid of abstraction: "The word 'direct' implies that the
activity... produce the effect.... The distinction between a direct
and an indirect effect turns, not upon the magnitude of either the
cause or the effect, but entirely upon the manner in which the effect
has been brought about." 18 9 Though undoubtedly formal in its
application, Sutherland's test for interstate commerce was pragmatic
and reflected his abiding concern with curbing governmental power in
order to preserve individual liberty. He erred, however, in failing to
recognize the limitations of classical jurisprudence in addressing
constitutional problems arising from the Depression and the
imperative of reassessing traditional notions of federalism.
D. ProgressiveAspects of Sutherland's
Economic Liberty Jurisprudence
Despite Sutherland's formalism, his constitutional thought, at
times, revealed a strong progressive strain, as seen from his opinions
that approved local governmental authority to regulate some forms of
land use. In Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Corp.,190 the Court
187. 298 U.S. 238, 278-324 (1936).
188. See id. at 307-09 (invalidating the Guffey Act under the Commerce Clause). Sutherland
refrained from determining directly whether the Guffey Act's price fixing provisions violated
liberty of contract, noting they were "so related to and dependent upon the labor provisions...
as to make it clearly probable that the latter being held bad, the former would not have been
passed. The fall of the latter, therefore, carries down with it the former." Id. at 316. Curiously,
Sutherland employed the passive voice to clarify the scope of an otherwise clear decision, as if he
used considerable restraint to not reiterate his concept of liberty of contract. However,
Sutherland did suggest the Guffey Act represented illegitimate class legislation that compelled a
"dissentient minority, either of producers or miners or both, to the will of the stated majority" to
comply with its hours and wage requirements. Id. at 311. Moreover, Congress did not devise
these regulations; instead, it impermissibly delegated this lawmaking function "to private
persons whose interests may be and often are adverse to the interests of others in the same
business." Id.
189. Id. at 308 (explaining the concept that manufacturing is distinct from commerce; it
precedes commerce, a notion initially set forth in United States v.E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1,
11-13 (1895) and applied faithfully by legions of legal classicists); see Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247
U.S. 251, 277-81 (1918) (distinguishing manufacturing from commerce).
190. 272 U.S. 365, 379-97 (1926).
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upheld a zoning ordinance that restricted industrial expansion in a
village contiguous to Cleveland. 191 Rather than endorse the unbridled
concept of economic liberty asserted by businesses that invoked
substantive due process to shield them from compliance with the local
zoning scheme, Sutherland recognized the exercise of local powers to
address a pervasive problem within the community. 92 To this extent,
he eschewed abstract theory and relied upon the common law doctrine
of nuisance to justify land restrictions enacted to facilitate the public
interest in quiet use and enjoyment of residential property. 193 Insofar
as Sutherland realized that the Euclid zoning ordinance would
enhance some property values, he also expressed considerable
deference to local police powers because the village regulated the land
in a manner beneficial to the public as a whole. 194 For similar reasons,
he also sustained the authority of other municipalities to regulate
195
land use.
Sutherland's progressivism also surfaced in his support of
workers' compensation programs. Years before he joined the Court,
the Utah native lent his support to both state and federal workers'
compensation plans primarily because they appealed to his sense of
equity in that they helped mitigate the harsh reality of industrial
191. Id. at 391-95.
192. See id. at 391-92 (recognizing that "the segregation of industries, commercial pursuits,
and dwellings to particular districts in a city, when exercised reasonably, may bear rational
relation to the health, morals, safety, and general welfare of the community"). Sutherland also
demonstrated his willingness to apply the constitution to changing circumstances, explaining
that "while the meaning of constitutional guaranties never varies, the scope of their application
must expand or contract to meet the new and different conditions .... [A] degree of elasticity is
thus imparted, not to the meaning, but to the applicationof constitutional principles." Id. at 387.
193. See id. at 387-88 (finding "no serious difference of opinion in respect of the validity of
laws and regulations fixing the height of buildings within reasonable limits, the character of
materials and methods of construction, . . . and excluding from residential sections offensive
trades, industries and structures likely to create nuisances"). Using the common law of nuisance
as a guide in this case, Sutherland pithily explained that "[a] nuisance may be merely a right
thing in the wrong place, like a pig in the parlor instead of in the barnyard." Id. at 388.
194. See id. at 388-90 (finding the ordinance a "proper exercise of the police power").
Initially, Sutherland considered the Euclid ordinance unconstitutional, but at the behest of
Justice Stone, among others on the Court, Sutherland acquiesced in the re-argument of the case,
after which he concluded that the law reasonably advanced local police powers. See Alfred
McCormack, A Law Clerk's Recollections, 46 COLUM. L. REV. 710, 712 (1946) (noting that
Sutherland's discussions with Stone "shook his convictions and led him to request a reargument,
after which he changed his mind and the ordinance was upheld").
195. See Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 608-10 (1927) (Sutherland, J.) (upholding a Roanoke,
Virginia set-back ordinance as a legitimate exercise of local police powers in response to
changing economic conditions); Zahn v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 274 U.S. 325 (1927) (Sutherland, J.)
(upholding the authority of Los Angeles to bar commercial buildings from a residential area). But
see Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928) (Sutherland, J.) (voiding a Cambridge,
Massachusetts zoning ordinance because its restriction of a landowner from using his property
for industrial purposes did not bear a significant relationship to the public welfare).
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accidents and provided more widespread compensation to victims than
remedies based upon ordinary principles of tort law. 19 6 In Cudahy
Packing Co. v. Parramore,19 7 Sutherland adopted a case-by-case
approach to determine the scope of workers' compensation legislation
in rejection of a staid formulaic approach. 198 In contrast with cases
involving liberty of contract, Sutherland appeared willing to consider
changing industrial conditions to determine the limits of local police
powers. That he perceived workers' compensation laws as "ha[ving] a
tendency to promote a more equitable distribution of the economic
burdens in cases of personal injury"1 99 belies the conventional notion
that Sutherland was a socioeconomic reactionary. It also shows his
occasional pragmatism.
For Sutherland, the notion of progress was consonant with his
view of public welfare. His was a conservative progressivism born of
caution and deliberation rather than an impulse to yield to the
transitory
emotions
of democratic
majorities. 20 0
Wary
of
experimentation for its own sake, Sutherland reposed his trust in
experience and common sense and urged government to proceed
slowly in addressing problems arising from changing social and
economic conditions. 20 1 Though he viewed societal progress as an
evolutionary process, 20 2 unlike Social Darwinists Herbert Spencer and

196. See Sutherland, Economic Value and Social Justice, supra note 89, at 8-11
(demonstrating Sutherland's public support for worker's compensation plans throughout his
address to the International Association of Casualty and Surety Underwriters Convention).
Elsewhere, speaking in favor of worker's compensation for federal railroad employees,
Sutherland said: "We must take care that these people do not become wrecks, human*driftwood
to society. That is one object of this legislation. The law of negligence is hard; it is unjust, it is
cruel in its operation. The law of compensation proceeds upon broad humanitarian principles."
48 CONG. REC. 4846, 4853 (1912) (statement of Sen. Sutherland).
197. 263 U.S. 418, 421-26 (1923).
198. See id. at 424 (arguing that "[n]o exact formula can be laid down which will
automatically solve every case").
199. Id.
200. See Sutherland, The Courts and the Constitution, supra note 104, at 383 (arguing for
cautious treatment of popular legislation).
201. See 47 CONG. REC. 2794-95, 2797-98, 2800, 2803 (1911) (statement of Sen. Sutherland)
(demonstrating further Sutherland's skeptical view of impulsive, popular legislation). Later
Sutherland explained: "On the whole I entertain a profound regard for notions which have long
persisted, because, having passed the scrutiny and survived the buffetings of time, they are more
likely to be right than wrong.
51 CONG. REC. 3598, 3600 (1914) (statement of Sen.

Sutherland).
202. See Sutherland, Principleor Expedient?, supra note 105, at 7, 21 (detailing Sutherland's
views of society and social order). For Sutherland, experience, not emotion-and certainly not
partial, or class, legislation enacted at the behest of political factions who manipulated the

legislative process-provided an essential perspective from which to assess the need for change.
In this regard, he remarked:
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William Graham Sumner, the Utahan rejected the concept of survival
of the fittest, and he categorically rejected governmental intervention
into private economic affairs. Instead, Sutherland believed that
government could facilitate progress by "thoroughgoing investigation,
dispassionate consideration ... and ... courageous patience which
moves deliberately in the face of clamorous demands to make
haste."

203

This strain of progressive conservatism in Sutherland's
thought therefore complemented the factional aversion that infused
his constitutional jurisprudence of economic liberty. He invalidated
class legislation, in part, because its inherent inequality undermined
its capacity to foster progress on behalf of the public as a whole.
Conversely, Sutherland readily upheld zoning ordinances and
workers' compensation laws based on equitable principles precisely
because they inured to the benefit of the public in ways that
exemplified equal operation of the law and represented careful,
deliberate attempts by government to foster progress in response to
changing social and economic conditions.
In essence, Sutherland understood his juridical role in terms of
guardian judicial review. A faithful adherent of legal classicism, who
like conservative jurists before him perceived the Constitution in
negative terms, Sutherland's aversion toward political factions was
the touchstone of his constitutional jurisprudence. Though seemingly
devoted to property rights and often critical of public economic
regulation, he nevertheless recognized the propriety of and necessity
for governmental power exercised pursuant to the equal operation of
the law.
V. ECONOMIC RIGHTS AS A CONSTITUTIONAL PARADIGM

Sutherland, like conservative jurists before him, regarded
economic rights as a paradigm for other constitutional liberties and
understood that the liberty protected by due process included both
tangible and intangible aspects. Accordingly, he perceived that
We learn to distinguish what is wise and right from what is wrong and
foolish by experience which compels our assent rather than by precept which
only advises our understanding; molding by evolutionary rather than by
revolutionary methods the fundamental principles of law and government
into appropriate form.
Sutherland, supra note 116, at 2.
203. 47 CONG. REC. 2793, 2795 (1911) (statement of Sen. Sutherland). Accordingly,
Sutherland criticized the initiative, referendum and recall provisions of the proposed Arizona
constitution because they represented ill-conceived, intemperate and short-sighted legislation
inimical to the public welfare. Id.
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political factions, class legislation, and the unequal operation of the
law threatened personal rights of all kinds and thus did not
necessarily distinguish between economic and noneconomic interests
in his application of guardian judicial review. In fact, Sutherland
concluded his New State Ice Co. opinion, which invalidated a state ice
monopoly, with a brief reference suggesting parallels between liberty
of contract and the freedom of expression. 2 4 Often overlooked in
conventional portraits of the jurist as an inflexible social and economic
conservative is the manner in which his factional aversion influenced
his understanding of press autonomy and criminal procedure. Ever
worried about the influence of political factions, Sutherland, in a few
notable instances, used guardian judicial review to protect the media
and criminal defendants from the tyranny of democratic majorities.
A. The First Amendment and the Business of Expression
Often neglected by constitutional scholars is Sutherland's
occasional solicitude for freedom of the press. In part, Sutherland's
forgotten First Amendment legacy derives from the relative paucity of
his decisions in this area. Aside from his opinions in Grosjean v.
American Press Co. 20 5 and Associated Press v. NLRB, 20 6 Sutherland
rarely expressed strong sentiment in favor of a free press. 20 7 However,
Sutherland's powerful invocation of First Amendment limitations
upon governmental authority in these two cases reveals the extent to
which factional aversion linked his jurisprudence of economic liberty
and his paramount concern for preserving individual rights from what
he perceived as the tyranny of democratic majorities. Implicitly,
Sutherland realized that partial economic laws threatened freedom of
the press, and accordingly he recognized the importance of protecting
the business of expression from political factions.
Sutherland advanced the business of expression as a hybrid
constitutional concept when, during the 1930s, a bare majority of the
Court adopted a deferential approach in matters of economic
regulation and more closely scrutinized laws that restricted First
Amendment rights. Sutherland, who clung to the tenets of legal

204. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 280 (1932).
205. 297 U.S. 233, 240-51 (1936).
206. 301 U.S. 103, 133-41 (1937) (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
207. See, e.g., Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 723 (1931) (Sutherland, J., joining Butler, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that a Minnesota law that authorized interdiction of publications of reputed
scurrilous tendency was a reasonable means of limiting a public nuisance); see also Olken, The
Business of Expression, supra note 4, at 306-08 (discussing Sutherland's pre-Grosjean First
Amendment record).
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classicism, resisted differentiating between economic and noneconomic
rights and opposed the attendant jurisprudential transformation from
which emerged bifurcated judicial review. 20
Modern scholars
accustomed to the dichotomous operation of multi-tiered judicial
review rarely consider Sutherland's First Amendment contributions
because they reflected jurisprudential assumptions now considered
obsolete and supplanted by the mythical constitutional revolution of
20 9
the 1930s.
Interestingly, as Sutherland's jurisprudence of economic liberty
was losing ground within the Court, his emphasis upon equal
operation of the law enabled him to forge a nexus between political
factions, economic rights, and freedom of expression. Throughout his
judicial tenure Sutherland opposed progressive (in terms of rates)
taxation of chain stores and other businesses as illegitimate class
legislation of dubious advantage to the public welfare. 210 He also
construed broadly the concept of liberty within the ambit of the Due
Process Clause to include intangible rights such as the pursuit of
property and other facets of commercial activity. 2 11 From this
perspective, he worried that differential taxation of the press would
impair the economic and expressive rights of unpopular segments of
the print media.

208. In United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938), Justice
Harlan F. Stone suggested that the Court more carefully scrutinize laws that threatened either
fundamental constitutional rights or involved suspect legislative classifications such that
inadequate protection existed throughout the normal political process. See also Olken, The
Business of Expression, supra note 4, at 282-83 (discussing the emergent dichotomy during the
1930s in judicial review of statutes that affected economic liberty and freedom of expression).
209. See, e.g., CUSHMAN, supra note 17, at 133-35 (discussing the labor context of Associated
Press but omitting discussion of Sutherland's dissent and its First Amendment analysis);
KAUFMAN, supra note 16, at 539-41 (explaining Justice Cardozo's significant contribution to
Sutherland's Grosjean opinion and his pivotal role in convincing Sutherland to base the decision
upon the First Amendment rather than upon equal protection). In so doing, Kaufman, at least
implicitly diminishes Sutherland's First Amendment contribution and, more significantly,
ignores the manner in which Sutherland melded freedom of expression and economic liberty.
Other scholars also make this mistake. See, e.g., DAVID CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE

SUPREME COURT: THE SECOND CENTURY 1888-1986, at 260 (1990) (analyzing Grosjean as only a
pure First Amendment case); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 773, 817,

998, 1004, 1040 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing Grosjean and the First Amendment).
210. See, e.g., Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Grosjean, 301 U.S. 412, 430-34 (1937)
(Sutherland, J., dissenting) (opposing a tax on Louisiana business operators); State Bd. of Tax
Comm'rs of Ind. v. Jackson, 283 U.S. 527, 544-48 (1931) (Sutherland, J., dissenting) (opposing
Indiana's graduated license fees on store owners); see also Olken, The Business of Expression,
supra note 4, at 296-98 (discussing conservative opposition towards state licensing taxes within
the Supreme Court during the 1920s and 1930s).
211. See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 278-80 (1932) (recognizing the
right to engage in a lawful private business); Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 545
(1923) (recognizing the right to acquire property).
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In Grosjean v. American Press Co., 2 12 a unanimous Court
invalidated a Louisiana licensing law that levied a two percent tax on
the gross advertising receipts of periodicals published within the state
whose weekly circulation exceeded 20,000 copies. Enacted by a
Democratic political faction controlled by U.S. Senator Huey P. Long
and Governor Oscar K. Allen, this act, dubbed by its proponents as
"[a] tax on lying, 2 cents a lie,"213 applied only to the Bayou state's
thirteen largest newspapers, which, unlike Louisiana's smaller, rural
periodicals, were longstanding critics of the Long political machine
and the efforts of its charismatic leader to implement a far ranging
public works program financed by comprehensive commercial taxes. 214
Justice Sutherland, highly suspicious of the law's factional
origins and cognizant of its differential effect upon a small segment of
the media, wrote the Court's opinion, careful to mix consideration of
the statute's financial burden upon targeted publishers with
discussion of the law's detrimental effects upon freedom of the press.
In particular, the form of the license tax suggested its punitive intent
and revealed its partial nature. 2 15 As with other types of economic
regulation, Sutherland scrutinized closely the Louisiana law to
ascertain whether it truly operated as a revenue measure. Finding
that the state actually differentiated between periodicals based upon
circulation volume rather than advertising revenue, 216 Sutherland
concluded the law's partial effects undermined its legitimacy in much
the same way he reasoned in other cases that chain store taxes bore
the pernicious influence of political factions. 217 Though Sutherland's
212. 297 U.S. 233, 240-51 (1936).

213. See Appellees' Brief at 9, Grosjean, 297 U.S.
circular distributed by Sen. Huey P. Long and Louisiana
Record at 43, Am. Press Co. v. Grosjean, 10 F. Supp.
Affidavit of Marshall Ballard & J. Walker Ross (Nov. 23,

233 (1936) (No. 303) (quoting a 1934
Governor Oscar K. Allen); Transcript of
161 (E.D. La. 1935) (No. 315) (quoting
1934)).

214. See RICHARD C. CORTNER, THE KINGFISH AND THE CONSTITUTION: HUEY LONG, THE
FIRST AMENDMENT, AND THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN PRESS FREEDOM IN AMERICA 19-20 (1996)

(discussing the opposition of urban Louisiana newspapers to Huey Long); Olken, The Business of
Expression, supra note 4, at 284-92 (discussing the political and economic context of the
Louisiana licensing tax on newspapers).
215. See Grosjean, 297 U.S. at 250-51 (pointing out the suspicious nature of the tax).
Sutherland commented:
The form in which the tax is imposed is itself suspicious. It is not measured
or limited by the volume of advertisements. It is measured alone by the
extent of the circulation of the publication in which the advertisements are
carried, with the plain purpose of penalizing the publishers and curtailing
the selection of a selected group of newspapers.
Id. at 251.
216. Id. at 251.
217. See, e.g., State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs of Ind. v. Jackson, 283 U.S. 527, 544-48 (1935)
(Sutherland, J., dissenting) (describing the effects of the Indiana store license fees as "obvious
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initial impulse was to decide Grosjean solely as an economic liberty
case, eventually he incorporated Justice Cardozo's draft concurrence
that emphasized freedom of the press into the final opinion. 218 Not
only did Sutherland recognize the interplay between expressive and
business rights at issue in the case, but his willingness to
accommodate a Justice with whom he often disagreed suggests he may
have been less rigid than his critics would believe.
Sutherland noted that insofar as the Louisiana licensing law
created a differential tax borne by a distinct minority of newspapers, it
also restricted freedom of expression. Huey Long's political faction
devised this tax to penalize those segments of the media critical of the
Kingfish's regime and to impose a tariff based upon their circulation
volumes under the guise of a seemingly neutral economic
regulation. 219 In effect, the tax burdened a select group of periodicals
highly dependent upon advertising revenue to defray publication and
distribution costs not otherwise covered by subscription fees and
individual purchases. 220 As such, the law threatened to curtail
newspaper circulation, which was both integral to the business of the
press and critical to its informative function in democratic society. 221
and flagrant discriminations which put upon the act the clear stamp of unconstitutionality"); see
also Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404, 422 (1935) (ruling that gross inequality in taxes violates
the Fourteenth Amendment). Sutherland explained in Colgate: 'The classification ... must be
founded upon pertinent and real differences, as distinguished from artificial ones." Colgate, 296
U.S. at 423. Similarly, in Grosjean, Sutherland considered the Louisiana licensing tax a partial
law enacted at the behest of a political faction controlled by Huey Long and Oscar Allen intent
upon thwarting criticism of its social and economic policies by certain segments of the press See
297 U.S. at 244-45, 250-51 (arguing that the "plain purpose" of the tax was to "penaliz[e] the
publishers and curtaila the circulation of a selected group of newspapers"). The American
Newspaper Publishers Association, for whom Elisha Hanson (who argued for the appelleesnewspapers in Grosjean) was general counsel, anticipated Sutherland's conclusion. This
newspaper organization asserted "that the freedom of the press includes the freedom from unjust
and discriminatory taxation by which hostile political factions may seek to stifle criticism
through attempting the economic destruction of their critics." CORTNER, supra note 214, at 171
(quoting 69 EDITOR & PUBLISHER 41, 41 (Feb. 15, 1936)).
218. See KAUFMAN, supra note 16, at 540-41 (discussing Cardozo's draft concurring opinion
in Grosjean and his significant contribution to Sutherland's final opinion for the Court); Olken,
The Business of Expression, supra note 4, at 298-99, 305 n.262 (discussing Cardozo's influence
upon Sutherland and Harlan Stone's advice to Sutherland that he not dwell upon the legislative
motive behind the license tax and simply focus on its facial discrimination).
219. Grosjean, 297 U.S. at 241, 244-45, 250-51.
220. See Olken, The Business of Expression,.supranote 4, at 287-88 (discussing the economic
realities of the Louisiana licensing tax).
221. Grosjean, 297 U.S. at 250:
The tax here involved is ... bad because, in light of its history and of its
present setting, it is ... a deliberate and calculated devise in the guise of a
tax to limit the circulation of information to which the public is entitled ....
A free press stands as one of the great interpreters between the government
and the people.
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Significantly, Sutherland, albeit at the urging of Justices Cardozo and
Stone, analyzed the licensing tax from the dual perspectives of
economic liberty and freedom of expression and concluded that it
222
impeded the newspaper's business of expression.
In so doing, Sutherland explicitly recognized economic rights
and expressive ones as complementary aspects of personal liberty; the
business of expression, Sutherland implicitly set forth, therefore
223
marked the coalescence of commercial and expressive activities.
Moreover, Sutherland regarded freedom of the press as an essential
means for exposing the influence of political factions. 2 24 Accordingly, a
Louisiana licensing tax enacted by a pro-Huey Long faction to restrict.
the commercial enterprise of newspapers critical of Long's policies
posed a significant threat to the public because of its potential to
225
thwart the newspaper's dissemination of important information.
The following year, Sutherland's dissent in Associated Press
revealed even more clearly his commitment to freedom of the press in

See also id. at 247, 249-50 (discussing the similarity of the repressive colonial stamp tax and the
Framers' desire to prevent this situation from ever occurring again).
222. This Article uses the phrase "the business of expression" in reference to the confluence
of economic liberty and freedom of expression. In both Grosjean and Associated Press, Sutherland
perceived that economic regulation of the commercial or business facets of the press adversely
affected core expressive activities, and thus impaired the business of expression for some
segments of the press. Sensitive to the problems of class legislation, Sutherland believed that in
each case political factions sought to enact regulatory laws intended to curb freedom of
expression through restricting the economic liberty of the press. See Olken, The Business of
Expression, supra note 4, at 256-57, 282-83, 300-06 (discussing Sutherland's view of economic
liberty and freedom of expression as similar aspects of personal liberty despite the emergence of
bifurcated judicial review of these concepts during this time).
223. See id. at 300-06 (discussing Sutherland's belief that freedom of expression and
economic freedom were part of the same whole-personal freedom). At oral argument,
Sutherland asked Elisha Hanson, counsel for the newspapers, whether the Louisiana licensing
tax "would tend to curtail circulation." Hanson answered: "Yes ....
It would also turn the
business of one newspaper group over to another." CORTNER, supra note 214, at 163 (quoting
NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Jan. 14, 1936, at 28). Sutherland incorporated Hanson's
response into his Grosjean opinion when he described the operative effects of the Louisiana
licensing tax: "It thus operates as a restraint in a double sense. First, its effect is to curtail the
amount of revenue realized from advertising, and, second, its direct tendency is to restrict
circulation .... [Ilt might well result in destroying both advertising and circulation." 297 U.S. at
244-45.
224. Years before, Sutherland explained:
The guaranties for safe-guarding life, liberty and property, freedom of speech,
of the press and of religious worship, and all the other guaranties of the
Constitution, would be of little value if their interpretations and enforcement
depended upon arbitrary, shifting, temporary official edicts instead of the
calm, judgment of the judiciary under the general law of the land.
Sutherland, Principleor Expedient?, supra note 105, at 11.
225. See Grosjean, 297 U.S. at 249-50 (finding that this tax had "a long history of hostile
misuse against the freedom of the press").
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the context of commercial activity. In Associated Press, five of the
Justices upheld the application of the National Labor Relations Act to
the editorial operations of a private agency that collected news items,
rewrote them, and distributed the articles to a national network of
newspapers, as both within the Commerce Clause powers of the
federal government 226 and as a legitimate economic regulation under a
fairly deferential standard of review. 227 In a 5-4 decision, the Court
upheld the constitutional authority of the National Labor Relations
Board ("NLRB") to issue a cease and desist order that the Associated
Press refrain from interfering with the collective bargaining activities
of its editorial employees and reinstate a union leader, Morris Watson,
whom the news entity dismissed. 2 28 Justice Owen Roberts's majority
opinion rested upon the premise that the underlying dispute involved
an economic issue-in fact, Roberts was skeptical about the First
Amendment claim of the Associated Press, raised for the first time on
appeal-and thus applied a deferential standard of review predicated
upon his observation that the law was a general economic regulation
of incidental effect upon the news agency's First Amendment
229
interests.
In dissent, Sutherland, who disagreed with both Roberts's
characterization of the labor Act and the Court's relative deference,
focused instead upon how the NLRB interfered with the autonomy of
news editors to control the content of their stories and make personnel
decisions. In essence, Sutherland analyzed the dispute through the
prism of factional aversion and found that "through the guise of a
226. See Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 128-30 (1937) (finding the Associated
Press "so engaged in interstate commerce the Congress may adopt appropriate regulations of its
activities for the protection and advancement and for the insurance of the safety of such
commerce"). Associated Press was one of a quintet of cases decided on April 12, 1937, in which
the Supreme Court upheld the application of the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") to
private commercial enterprise. See also NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 4549 (1937) (sustaining application of the NLRA to the steel industry); NLRB v. Fruehauf Trailer
Co., 301 U.S. 49, 51-57 (1937) (sustaining application of the NLRA to the manufacture of
trailers); NLRB v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., 301 U.S. 58, 70-75 (1937) (sustaining
the application of the NLRA to clothing manufacturers); Wash., Va. & Md. Coach Co. v. NLRB,
301 U.S. 142, 144-47 (1937) (sustaining the application of the NLRA to a private company
engaged in interstate transportation). The Four Horsemen, Justices Butler, McReynolds,
Sutherland and Van Devanter, dissented from all but one of these cases, Washington, Virginia &
Maryland Coach Co., in which they assented to the Court's opinion.
227. See Associated Press, 301 U.S. at 131-33 (noting that "the Associated Press is not
immune from regulations because it is an agency of the press").
228. Id.
229. See id. at 133 (arguing that "[t]he order of the Board in nowise circumscribes the full
freedom and liberty of the petitioner to publish the news as it desires"). Roberts declared: "The
publisher of a newspaper has no special immunity from the application of general laws ....The
regulation here in question has no relation whatever to the impartial distribution of news." Id.
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seemingly neutral economic regulation" 23 0 the NLRB had actually
interfered with both the economic liberty of the Associated Press and
its editorial discretion. For Sutherland, the National Labor Relations
Act signified a partial law that promoted the freedom of employees
engaged in the process of collective bargaining but also impaired the
managerial discretion of the Associated Press to dismiss members of
its editorial staff whose pro-union bias threatened to compromise the
news agency's objective reportage of labor and business affairs. 23 1 As
an economic restriction upon the autonomy of the Associated Press, it
232
also affected the news organization's freedom of expression.
Significantly, Sutherland refused to distinguish, as had the Roberts
majority, between economic and expressive rights; he instead
perceived the case as one involving the business of expression that
warranted much more careful scrutiny of the operative effects of the
23 3
law under which the NLRB issued its orders.
Sutherland explained that "[w]hen applied to the press, the
term freedom ...

234
means more than publication and circulation."

Linking the First Amendment interests of the Associated Press with
its economic ones, Sutherland further remarked that the news entity
had "the liberty to exercise an uncensored judgment in respect of the
employment and discharge of [its] agents." 235 Accordingly, Sutherland
construed the NLRB order that the Associated Press reinstate Watson
as a form of compelled speech because it forced the news organization
to employ an editor whose judgment the Associated Press
questioned. 23 6 Melding factional aversion with the First Amendment,
Sutherland observed that the NLRB action skewed the marketplace of
ideas:
230. Olken, The Business of Expression, supra note 4, at 323.
231. See Associated Press, 301 U.S. at 137-40 (Sutherland, J., dissenting) (suggesting that
the Associated Press might have concluded "that its policy to preserve its news service free from
color, bias, or distortion was likely to be subverted by Watson's retention"); see also id. at 104-17
(quoting the oral argument of John W. Davis, counsel for the Associated Press). Davis argued
that "those who publish and print the news must have the right to choose the people by whom
the news is to be written before it is printed. You cannot divorce ... the author from his product.
... Transcript of Oral Argument of Petitioner at 733, Associated Press, 301 U.S. 103 (1937) (No.
365).
232. See Associated Press, 301 U.S. at 137-40 (Sutherland, J., dissenting) (arguing that
"[w]hen applied to the press, the term freedom is not to be narrowly confined").
233. See Olken, The Business of Expression, supra note 4, at 321-27 (discussing Sutherland's
opposition to treating economic and expressive rights differently).
234. Associated Press, 301 U.S. at 137 (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
235. Id.
236. See id. at 137-41 (arguing that the reinstatement of an editorial writer discharged
under these circumstances would abridge the freedom of the press guaranteed by the First
Amendment).
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[A]n unbiased version of [news about matters of labor and business] is of the utmost
public concern. To give a group of employers on the one hand, or a labor organization, on
the other, power of control over such a service is obviously to endanger the fairness and
237
accuracy of the service.

In tandem, Sutherland's opinions in Grosjean and Associated
Press demonstrate his use of constitutional limitations to protect
individual liberty, albeit that of corporations engaged in the dual
endeavors of expression and commerce, from class legislation. While,
to most members of the Hughes Court and subsequent scholars,
Grosjean and Associated Press presented disparate issues of economic
regulation and the First Amendment, Sutherland understood that
both cases arose from attempts by political factions to impede freedom
of expression through economic means. Cognizant of the vulnerability
in a democratic republic of personal rights of all kinds to political
factions, Sutherland applied guardian judicial review to protect
economic liberty as a constitutional paradigm of other rights and
forged a nexus between freedom of the press and economic liberty.
Significantly, his inchoate recognition of the business of expression
anticipated the modern Court's approach to differential taxation of the
press, 238 a point often obscured by those who mistakenly assess
Sutherland's jurisprudence from the binary historical perspective
spawned by the victors in the constitutional revolution of the 1930s.
B. CriminalProcedure
Sutherland's aversion toward factions also influenced his
criminal procedure jurisprudence. As in his jurisprudence of economic
liberty, Sutherland insisted upon neutrality of governmental action in
criminal cases. Long interested in matters of criminal law, Sutherland
had helped draft a revised federal criminal code while in Congress.
Theoretically concerned with the arbitrary and unreasonable exercise
of criminal procedure, Sutherland also viewed issues of criminal
procedure from a practical perspective and, at times, revealed a
progressive impulse often overlooked by his critics.

237. Id. at 138.
238. See, e.g., Ark. Writers' Project v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 227-34 (1987) (invalidating an
Arkansas sales tax applicable only to general interest magazines as an unconstitutional
restriction of freedom of the press); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm'r of Revenue,
460 U.S. 575, 586-93 (1983) (voiding a Minnesota use tax on ink and paper that exempted small
publishers as an unconstitutional infringement of freedom of the press); see also Olken, The
Business of Expression, supra note 4, at 327-39 (discussing Sutherland's forgotten First
Amendment legacy and the imperative of heightened review in cases involving the interplay of
economic and expressive interests).
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Sutherland's opinion in Powell v. Alabama239 exemplifies his
heightened sensitivity to the problems factions pose in the democratic
process. In Powell, a lynch mob threatened to take justice into its own
hands outside the rural jail in which the Scottsboro defendants-nine
young African American men-awaited trial for the alleged gang rape
of two white women in the boxcar of a train. Cognizant of the
circumstances under which the State of Alabama prosecuted these
illiterate and impoverished defendants, Sutherland's opinion
demonstrated his passion for legitimate procedure and the sanctity of
the rule of law. Implicitly, Sutherland understood that unequal
operation of the law, as occurred in Powell, threatens the individual
liberty of all citizens. Accordingly, he ruled that the defendants were,
in effect, deprived of counsel as a matter of due process when the trial
judge assigned a single lawyer, with little time to prepare a defense, to
represent them as a group. 240 Though relatively narrow in scope,
Powell is a critical link in the chain of Supreme Court precedent that
culminated in the more inclusive incorporation of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel in felony cases recognized in Gideon v.
241
Wainwright.
Similarly, Sutherland emphasized the importance of impartial
governmental authority in Berger v. United States,242 in which the
Court ordered a retrial in a conspiracy case marred by the misconduct
of a prosecutor who engaged in improper cross-examination and made
a prejudicial closing statement. In his opinion for the Court,
Sutherland explained that the prosecutor's behavior undermined the
neutrality and fairness of the proceedings. 243 From Sutherland's
perspective, impartial proceedings were essential in the maintenance
of the criminal justice system because of the equal operation of the law
in a democratic society.
Another case, Funk v. United States,244 reveals Sutherland's
notion of progress and helps belie the perception that the Utah Justice
was a social reactionary who rigidly interpreted the law. In Funk,
Sutherland refused to apply the common law evidentiary rule that
prevented the spouse of a criminal defendant from testifying at trial.
Rather than follow a legal principle of little relevance to twentieth239. 287 U.S. 45, 49-73 (1932).
240. Id. at 57-60, 67-72.
241. 372 U.S. 335, 341-45 (1963).
242. 295 U.S. 78, 79-89 (1935).
243. See id. at 84-85, 88 (finding that the "prosecuting attorney overstepped the bounds of
that propriety and fairness which should characterize the conduct of such an officer in the
prosecution of a criminal offense").
244. 290 U.S. 371, 373-87 (1933).
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century litigation, Sutherland permitted a woman to testify on behalf
of her husband in a criminal action. 245 Interestingly, Sutherland
justified this departure from the common law as the logical result of
changing societal notions about the competency of witnesses and the
evolutionary process in determining truth. Conservative in
temperament, Sutherland associated progress with gradual change
and understood the imperative for judicial recognition of a new
evidentiary rule. Sutherland reasoned "that a rule of evidence at one
time thought necessary to the ascertainment of truth should yield to
the experience of a succeeding generation whenever that experience
246
has clearly demonstrated the fallacy or unwisdom of the old rule."
In this regard, Sutherland's willingness to adapt the common
law in a flexible manner to redress problems arising from flawed
criminal procedures was consistent with his concerns about class
legislation and the vulnerability of personal economic rights in a
constitutional democracy. As in cases involving economic interests in
which he insisted that government regulation bear a close and
substantial relationship to the public welfare, Sutherland emphasized
that the legitimacy of the criminal justice system depended upon the
impartial administration of the law. 247 Unequal application of rules of
criminal procedure, therefore, jeopardized individual liberty much the
same way that partial laws threatened the security of property and
contract rights, and, in some instances, freedom of expression.
CONCLUSION

Long considered one of the Supreme Court's more conservative
Justices in matters of economic liberty, George Sutherland has
suffered in reputation primarily because of his vigorous opposition to
the fabled revolution of the 1930s, in which a bare majority of the
Justices began to adapt the Constitution to changing economic
circumstances and departed from the jurisprudential premises of legal
classicism and guardian judicial review. Close examination of
Sutherland's jurisprudence of economic liberty reveals, however, that
although he insisted upon adhering to classical and traditional notions
of law and the judicial function, neither laissez-faire economics, Social
245. See id. at 381 (finding "a refusal to permit the wife upon the ground of interest to testify
in behalf of her husband, while permitting him, who has the greater interest, to testify for
himself, presents a manifest incongruity").
246. Id. Sutherland also suggested that "[tihe public policy of one generation may not, under
changed conditions, be the public policy of another." Id.
247. See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 72-73 (1932) (finding the availability of
counsel necessary for a fair trial).
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Darwinism, nor natural rights wielded much influence upon his
perspective. Rather, his skepticism about public regulation of private
economic affairs emanated from his aversion toward political factions
and his abiding commitment to the equal operation of the law. These
were also integral components of classical legal thought, the
intellectual construct from which Sutherland and other conservative
jurists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries derived
their constitutional jurisprudence.
In particular, as a legal classicist Sutherland understood the
judicial function as one of guardian review in which judges used
seemingly neutral principles of law, historical custom, and precedent
in assessing the constitutional limits of governmental authority to
protect individual rights and liberties from the tyranny of democratic
majorities manipulated by political factions. In this regard,
Sutherland's factional aversion reflected his paramount concern with
governmental neutrality and his belief that government could best
promote the public welfare through the equal operation of its laws.
Accordingly, he broadly construed due process and equal protection as
constitutional means to restrict political factions from infringing upon
economic rights, which he also viewed as a paradigm for other rights
and liberties such as those involving certain aspects of freedom of
expression and criminal procedure.
Ironically, perhaps the main catalyst in the eclipse of
Sutherland's reputation concerning economic liberty was Sutherland
himself. Often preoccupied with political factions and class legislation,
Sutherland, at times, failed to perceive the practical effects of his
decisions and the limitations of his constitutional vision. His was
essentially a negative view of the Constitution in terms of economic
affairs; it existed primarily to restrict governmental authority in order
to protect individual liberty. Yet because he perceived the Constitution
primarily in terms of its limitations, he was unable, for the most part,
to appreciate the importance of adapting its provisions to changing
economic circumstances.
Though, at times, Sutherland demonstrated a progressive
streak, his predominant tendency was to cleave to the past when
assessing issues before him. In the vanguard of the conservative Taft
Court, Sutherland, by the end of his judicial tenure, increasingly
found himself in dissent from the Hughes Court's willingness to adapt
the Constitution to modern conditions and its burgeoning recognition
of the public interest in private economic affairs. Rather than balance
public power and private rights, Sutherland preferred to ascertain the
contours of governmental authority from a traditional anti-factional
perspective that featured mechanical, categorical reasoning in which
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jurists regarded themselves less as policymakers and more as
objective agents who used classical doctrines as a means of preserving
individual autonomy.
So intent was Sutherland on clinging to this tradition that he
failed to recognize the growing obsolescence of his jurisprudence of
economic liberty and its inability to resolve issues arising from
conflicts between interest groups. Sutherland's jurisprudence became
inevitably more myopic and vulnerable to misconceptions about his
judicial motivation. Consequently, Sutherland's more progressive
views about criminal procedure and the business of expression have
received much less attention than they deserve, overshadowed by his
seemingly reactionary opinions concerning economic liberty. Indeed,
the ultimate lesson of Sutherland's economic liberty jurisprudence is
how strict adherence to the past can relegate even the most
conscientious jurist to the dustbin of obsolescence.
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